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ABSTRACT
Environmental concerns have, gradually and 
precariously, become integrated into the American 
policymaking process. Recognized as an essential aspect of 
human quality of life, environmental policy receives ever 
increasing attention from American policymakers. Owing to 
developments such as the passage of the Clean Air Act and 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, the significance of addressing environmental 
challenges has garnered both domestic and international 
attention. In providing guidance for American environmental 
policies, American presidents function as vital arbiters in 
the shaping of domestic and international environmental 
policies. Herein lies the necessity for addressing 
environmental policymaking crafted within the parameters of 
American presidential power.
Although environmental policy outcomes are influenced 
by nonenvironmental policy calculations, policy 
transformations over the last three decades warrant 
investigating environmental policy formation as a distinct 
field. Public, presidential, and other policymaking factors 
reveal how crucial presidential power is in the 
determination of environmental policy outcomes. President 
George Bush demonstrated how vital presidential power is in 
the determination of such policy outcomes. His use of
iii
presidential power can be properly viewed as the decisive 
factor in the policy fulfillment of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
amendments and the treaty obligations the United States 
consented to at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the 
Environment and Development(UNCED). The 1990 Clean Air Act 
amendments required presidential execution of new emission 
mandates in order to achieve tougher clean air standards.
The 1992 UNCED treaty obligations depended upon presidential 
leadership to meet domestic and international treaty goals. 
President Bush's policy calculations decided the policy 
outcomes in both of these environmental policy areas.
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INTRODUCTION
The environment has become a public policy issue that receives its own 
distinct recognition within the Am erican political spectrum. This recognition has 
included direct discussion and action from policymakers over the last four decades.1 
For example, the first "environmental decade" was initiated in 1970 with the aim of 
protecting Am erica’s air, water, and other natural resources, a grand idea that took 
legislative form with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 
President Richard Nixon achieved a political landmark when he signed the 1970 Clean 
Air Act into law. One o f the most significant popular movements in American 
history transformed the environm ent into a issue-specific legislation and a fundamental 
political and social issue. Since the launching of the Clean A ir Act, the tide of public 
opinion favoring enhanced environmental protection has gained conviction and support 
from both societal mores and from scientific evidence. This scientific evidence has 
indicated man-made alterations to global life support systems has accelerated environ­
mental degradation and in the end basic quality o f life questions.
Public attention is focused on the environment, but such attention begs the 
question of the environm ent’s own significance. Popular passions change and are an 
awkward indicator o f an issue’s true import. Environmental policy has played a 
major, perhaps not pivotal, role in national politics before its dramatic resurgence 
during the 1960s.2 The prominence of environmental concerns has shaped different
symbols and policies throughout American history. This range o f symbols and 
policies has included the New D eal’s Civilian Conservation Corps to Theodore 
Roosevelt’s conservation agenda, as part of the Progressive Era.-' This historical 
reality demonstrates the environment has, in fact, played a role in our political arena 
within the last century. But the environm ent has been a constant and encompassing 
force in all human affairs throughout history. Thus there exists the necessity of 
studying the environment and how humans have approached and interacted with the 
environment.
How the Am erican public and its officials formulate environmental policy 
remains a compelling issue. What relationship does the government establish toward 
the environment? How ought the government create environmental public policy? 
Which branch o f the federal government should direct the development o f environ­
mental policy? Answers to these questions are not automatic nor final. A myriad of 
prescriptions addressing these challenging questions and other similar questions put 
forth by the literature are both debated and championed, especially in light o f basic 
pro and con concerns about protection and use o f the environment and natural 
resources. One such policy approach will suffice to demonstrate how elusive and 
difficult finding answers can be: Vice-President A1 Gore, writing on the environm en­
tal issue, states:
Every education is a kind o f inward journey, and 
my study o f the global environment has required a 
searching re-examination of the ways in which 
political motives and government policies have 
helped to create the crisis and now frustrate the 
solutions we need. Ecology is the study of bal-
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ance, and some of the same principles that govern 
the healthy balance o f elements in the global 
environm ent also apply to the healthy balances of 
forces making up our political system. In my 
view, however, our system is on the verge of 
losing its essential equilibrium. The problem is 
not so much one o f policy failures: much more 
worrisome are the failures o f candor, evasions of 
responsibility, and timidity o f vision that charac­
terize too many of us in government. M ore than 
anything else my study o f the environm ent has led
me to realize the extent to which our current 
public discourse is focused on the shortest of 
short-term values and encourages the American 
people to join us politicians in avoiding the most 
important issues and postponing the really diffi­
cult choices.4
The inherent difficulty in assessing and formulating environmental policy is not 
necessarily cause for austere cynicism. Rather environmental policy must be analyzed 
and evaluated on both practical and reasonable terms. This can be accomplished with 
a treatment o f public policymaking in the government. At what level of government 
can this treatment be best executed? And how can it be explained?
A vast array o f governmental levels could be utilized for such an endeavor. 
Local, state, interstate, national and international levels of government affect environ­
mental policy. All these levels could be utilized; but, for the purposes of project
manageability, the national level o f government, as the historical leader in environ­
mental policy, will be emphasized.
What part or branch of the national government would be best suited for this 
purpose? The legislative, executive, and judiciary branches all interact and overlap 
in many public policy areas, and the environmental arena is no exception. The
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executive branch will serve as the fulcrum for analyzing environmental policy in this 
undertaking. There are a few good reasons for selecting the executive branch. To 
begin with, the public itself and institutions throughout society view the President as 
the symbolic and actual leader on leading policy issues. Many legislative or policy 
initiatives must originate from the President. Furtherm ore, the President possesses 
the power and authority to secure policy efficacy. Thus it may be argued the success 
o f national environmental policy primarily rests with the President. Finally, national 
environmental policy feedback and outcomes are necessarily channeled through the 
presidency through mechanisms like public opinion or legislative checks and balances.
The recent developments o f the last few decades illustrate how pivotal the 
presidency has been in shaping public policy on the environment. During the 1970s 
the Executive’s adoption o f m ajor environmental and resource policies, such as the 
founding o f new institutions, the most notable o f which is the Environmental Protec­
tion Agency (EPA), provide evidence why this is true. Policy decisions, such as the 
management o f environmental programs and the spending levels o f these programs, 
are significantly influenced by presidential policymaking. Despite, for example, the 
Reagan adm inistration’s attempts throughout the 1980s to curtail environmental 
programs, they continued to survive, not only because of congressional support, but 
also because o f the courts and public opinion.5
It is safe to say that despite some executive efforts of the twelve previous 
years, environmental institutions, programs and advances will not be reversed. 
However, this trend does not deny that the 1990s will be different from the 1970s or
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1980s. If continuity in environmental policies is to be maintained or enhanced over 
the next decade, environmental policies will require careful attention and in many 
cases creative investigation for more effective and efficient approaches. Important 
changes in the 1990s also can be expected in the kinds o f ongoing and possible 
different environmental problems that will make their way onto governmental agendas 
and in the political responses to them .6
The political responses to evolving environmental challenges are vital to 
understanding how these challenges will be addressed and possibly solved. For 
example, when presidential action moves an environmental problem  onto the govern­
mental agenda, what kind o f policy outcome can be anticipated? W ould the political 
calculus between the president, Congress, the courts, local governments, interest 
groups, public opinion, and other political actors jeopardize the environmental goals 
sought in approved environmental legislation or approved environmental treaties? In 
other words, when the president and other political actors agree upon environmental 
policy goals will such goals survive the political process that created them to begin 
with? In the 1990s can such environmental policy ends be reconciled with the 
vicissitudes and vagaries o f presidential political reality? If presidential policymaking 
results in either an abandonment or indecision in how to achieve such goals what kind 
o f policy outcomes would result? Finally, would such abandonment or indecision 
generate across-the-board setbacks for a president in that both environmental policy 
goals and promises are not sought and kept, and that the perceived political gains 
from such policy reversals are not actually secured? Within the parameters of the
case areas investigated, this project aims to address the questions posed and provide 
some answers to these questions.
CHAPTER I
SELECTING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING AND  
ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL POLICYMAKING
A diverse and impressive range o f theoretical frameworks exist for analyzing 
and evaluating presidential power and policymaking. Different frameworks employ a 
macro approach, a micro approach or a combination o f both for such a task. The 
macro approach emphasizes the office o f the President. The office itself and its 
concomitant powers are the focus o f explanation for presidential action. The micro 
approach stresses the individual who holds the W hite House as the key determinant for 
explaining presidential actions. The main concern centers on the personality and 
psychology o f the individual in power.
A combination o f these approaches provides increased depth and breadth in the 
assessment o f presidential policymaking. The challenge now becomes which macro 
approach to select for evaluating presidential policymaking within the environmental 
field.
Five macro perspectives on the presidency were scrutinized. These five 
frameworks included the obligations perspective, the constraints perspective, the 
statecraft tradition, the anti-aggrandizement perspective and the roles perspective.
Each o f these categories will be individually discussed.
The obligations approach posits the presidency as vital for policy formation on
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national issues. This school o f thought identifies an issue (like the environm ent), 
defines it as falling unequivocally within presidential responsibility, highlights 
instances o f presidential dereliction, and exhorts current and future occupants o f the 
office to action. Often the presidency is chosen as the necessary source o f action 
because the other institutions o f government at the national, state, and local levels are 
assertedly unwilling or incapable o f adequate response.
One example o f this sentiment is expressed by Richard Longaker:
Wise and persistent use o f the instruments o f the 
presidency - the appointing power, the selective 
and vigorous use o f law enforcement, and the 
cumulative advances by means o f the imaginative 
application o f administrative discretion, to name 
only a few, can nourish freedom even in the face 
o f Cold W ar pressures. Executive neglect, on the 
other hand, may lead to the undermining o f the 
very substance o f American Constitutionalism.
W hat must be recognized today is that sustained 
leadership in the field must originate in W hite 
House direction, coordination, and sensitivity.
Because the major problems will find their way to 
the W hite House, to be dealt with or neglected, 
here in particular there should be individuals who 
speak o f liberty rather than security and who feel 
committed to a positive role for the Federal exec­
utive . . . 7
The obligations approach places considerable importance on the actions o f the 
president. The president is elevated to catalyst o f both conventional responsibilities 
and virtuous example.
The obligations approach features a dual pitfall. The first problem rests with 
the assumption that presidential activity can be anything other than beneficial and
humane. Both history and human nature challenge this assumption. W hile supporters 
o f the obligations approach are not oblivious to human shortcomings and empirical 
patterns, their view of presidential power is to capitalize on opportunities to use it. 
The obligationists do not delineate clear criteria between the use and abuse of 
presidential power - the President is merely obligated to use it. Not surprisingly, 
events such as Vietnam and W atergate tempered the enthusiasm for extending 
presidential obligations into new dimensions of public policy.
Closely related to the first problem  is the obligationist w riter’s tendency to 
construct prescriptions for presidential action without sufficiently addressing potential 
repercussions from the adoption o f their ideas. Likewise, they generally do not 
highlight political advantages that could be gained from fulfilling recommended 
obligations. The obligationist project thus renders itself hortatory and academic in its 
effects on the president. These two factors indicate why the obligations approach 
would be limited as a fram ework for assessing and evaluating environmental policym­
aking. The proponents o f this framework exhort at the expense of realistic policy 
actions.
The constraints perspective adopts a notably different line. The constraintist 
writers see the presidency as a vehicle for frustration and policy failure. This 
approach stems from John F.K ennedy’s experience as an activist president who 
proclaimed extensive responsibilities for his office. The inability to fulfill these self- 
proclaimed responsibilities cast the presidency in a shadow of doubt as an agent for 
policy transformation. Certainly there is an inclination among those who served in
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Kennedy’s administration to blame his disappointments on the constraints surrounding 
the presidency and the president’s lack of power to overcome them.
These notions are expressed in works by Schlesinger, Sorenson and Hilsman.
Hilsman invokes President Trum an’s famous comment he made when he reflected
upon turning the presidency over to Eisenhower: "He’ll sit here and he’ll say, ’Do
this! Do that!’ And nothing will happen. Poor Ike - it w on’t be a bit like the Arm y."
Hilsman expounds upon this observation:
In the field o f foreign affairs, the President’s 
power is immense. His is the monopoly in deal­
ing with other states. But he, too, must build a 
consensus for his policy if it is to succeed. He 
must bring along enough o f the different factions 
in Congress to forestall revolt, and he must con­
tend for the support o f wider constituencies, the 
press, interest groups, and ’attentive publics.’
Even within the Executive Branch itself, his 
policy will not succeed merely at his command, 
and he must build cooperation and support, obtain 
approval from some acquiescence from others, 
and enthusiasm from  enough to carry it to com­
pletion.8
A couple o f flaws rest with the constraints approach. The theory relies too 
heavily on the experiences o f one administration. What was true for the Kennedy 
Adm inistration may not be true for other presidencies or future presidencies. The 
constraints perspective is too narrow for explaining executive policy.
The other problem centers on the assumptions made by constraintist writers. 
The label o f this approach automatically indicates which direction policy execution 
will take. In other words, presumption rests with policy failure or circumvention.
The presidency continually struggles with other branches and institutions for fulfilling
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distinct policy ends. Furthermore, the ability of the W hite House to accomplish its 
policy goals is limited.
The third theoretical category can be appropriately labeled the statecraft 
approach. This school of thought traces its roots back to Machiavelli. Prominent 
statecraft writers such as Richard Neustadt openly proclaim they write in the tradition 
of M achiavelli. This tradition relies on a hard-headed devotion to the realities of 
power.
Richard N eustadt’s Presidential Power embodies many of the characteristics of 
the sobering statecraft account o f presidential power. Presidential Power outlines key 
aspects for explaining presidential power: The president wields overwhelming 
responsibilities; his powers are notably limited; the individual and psychological views 
of the occupant are significant; and finally, presidents such as Franklin D. Roosevelt 
with an activist realization o f the office are preferable to passive occupants such as 
Dwight D. Eisenhower. Neustadt does not prescribe structural or institutional 
changes in the office. Rather, his work is a manual exhorting the President how to 
maximize the powers already within his realm.
Neustadt explains how these elements constitute his statecraft theme in the
book:
The President remains our system ’s Great Initia­
tor. W hen what we once called ’w ar’ impends, 
he now becomes our system ’s Final Arbiter. He 
is no less a clerk in one capacity than in the 
other. But in the second instance those he serves 
are utterly dependent on his judgem ent, and judg­
ement then becomes the mark of ’leadership.’
Command may have a narrow reach but it encom-
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passes irreparable consequences. Yet persuasion 
is required to exercise command, to get one’s 
hand upon subordinate decisions. W ith this so 
nearly absolute dependence upon presidential 
judgem ent backed by presidential skill, we and 
our system have no previous experience...9
Hopefully, both citizens and presidents will approach presidential power 
without fear or histrionics or withdrawals from reality or lurches toward aggression. 
Regardless o f the dangers, presidential power, even in this new dimension, still has to 
be sought and used.
The statecraft approach does feature distinct merits in the assessment o f 
presidential power and its relation to policy making. The statecraft framework could 
provide useful guides to an ambitious individual for achieving policy ends regardless 
o f what means are employed. This emphasis on one individuals’s political skills does 
place less emphasis on the formal, constitutional powers of the executive in relation to 
the informal, extra-legal aspects of presidential power. This approach does not 
provide significant explanatory powers for assessing power and its relation to policy if 
the individual office holder does not exude his political skills in a given policy area. 
Such is the case when it comes to President Bush securing environmental policy aims. 
For this reason the statecraft framework was not adopted for the project.
The next theoretical framework considered can be conveniently labeled the 
anti-aggrandizement approach. This genre within presidential literature views 
executive power itself with suspicion. Anti-aggrandizement writers espouse a faith in 
the Constitution’s rendition of the balance and separation of powers between the 
branches. Thus any trend or arrangement that results in increased powers for the
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executive branch is viewed with trepidation.
Anti-aggrandizement writers acknowledge the evolving and challenging 
problems the United States faces domestically and internationally. But these new and 
complex problems do not warrant the increase in the expanse and num ber o f presiden­
tial roles - especially at the expense o f the legislative branch.
Edwin Corwin in his seminal work, The President: Office and Pow ers, 
observes what this phenomena entails: " ...a  long-term trend at work in the world that 
consolidates power in the executive department o f all governments". Thus there 
exists the possibility of an overreaching executive that encroaches upon the personal 
and private rights o f the citizens. Each president may differ in terms of institutional 
excesses and abuse o f presidential power, but the momentum to the institutionalization 
of the office is increasingly inevitable unless constitutional and organizational changes 
are purposely instituted to check presidential power. For example, Corwin advocates 
that the presidential cabinet be constructed from a joint Legislative Council including 
influential members o f Congress.
The anti-aggrandizement authors seek to limit executive discretion in achieving 
policy goals. This political prescription could unnecessarily hinder executive latitude 
in meeting crises or fulfilling an ambitious policy agenda. The environment is such a 
policy area where such latitude could be essential. Furthermore, the anti-aggrandize­
ment approach is a prescriptive attempt to formally limit the powers o f the president. 
This kind o f theoretical recommendation may be well-intentioned but does not address 
the reality o f the contemporary American executive who possesses an unprecedented
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degree o f policy discretion despite congressional and public efforts to contain such 
discretion. President Bush has proved to be no exception to this presidential pattern 
when it came to undermining the very same environmental policy goals he previously 
supported.
O f all the theoretical frameworks investigated, the roles approach featured the 
most net benefits. W hile the roles approach is not flawless, it features fewer disad­
vantages for explaining and evaluating presidential power and policymaking. In a 
nutshell, the roles approach is best suited for the purposes o f this work.
First, the roles framework is the most prevalent and academically respected 
way of viewing the presidency.10 This recognition does not necessarily fiat theoreti­
cal superiority, but it does indicate the roles view possesses resilience and flexibility 
the other fram eworks might lack. M oreover, a community of like minded scholars 
would not rely upon or recognize this framework so consistently. It could actually be 
labelled the received view of the office.
Second, depending upon the author, presidential roles are arrayed in a range 
from those provided in the Constitution, such as Chief Executive, to those which 
devolved upon the office like Chief Diplomat or World Leader or were granted as 
part o f the political socialization process, such as party leader or public opinion 
leader.
Clinton Rossiter’s widely known text, The American President, developed ten 
such roles for the president, including those of Chief Executive and World Leader.
Another author, Thomas A. Bailey, created an astounding forty-three roles for the 
president in his work on presidential significance. Bailey designed each role to 
measure both presidential greatness and to serve as a compendium on presidential 
responsibility. Contemporary authors such as Byron Daynes and Ray Tatalovich 
employ five roles in their investigations of modern presidential power. This diverse 
array in the number o f roles that can be created for analyzing and explaining the vast 
and intricate dimensions o f the office of the President indicates a combined flexibility 
and appeal in utilizing this theoretical framework.
Each role can be construed as a presidential responsibility. Thus any failure to 
fulfill presidential responsibilities results in institutional crisis. Furtherm ore, the 
public anticipates that the president will perform his roles. The president inherits the 
dual challenge o f fulfilling responsibility and exercising power, while at the same time 
trying to meet or control the public’s demands and at times, particularly in the era of 
powerful special interest groups, its whims. As a result, the occupant of the Oval 
Office can make a difference in policy formulation, as well as, legislative and 
implementational outcomes.
Any analysis o f presidential policymaking requires references to a myriad of 
discussions by scholars, journalists, and political leaders. In this project, the analysis 
of the presidential role in the arena o f environmental policymaking is considered via a 
framework suggestive o f a theory of presidential power and policymaking. This 
framework is adopted from Byron Daynes and Ray Tatalovich in their work Presiden­
tial Pow er. Their framework employs five roles and five determinants. The five
16
roles include Com m ander-in-Chief, Chief Diplomat, Chief Executive, Legislative 
Leader, and Opinion/Party Leader. Each role is designated to measure and explain 
presidential power in a distinct m anner. It is important to note that each role is not 
mutually exclusive in their function from the other roles. For example, a president 
could be performing all five roles simultaneously in a given situation. When Presi­
dent Bush spearheaded the Allied coalition during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, he 
could be viewed as performing all five roles in such tasks as persuading Congress to 
approve his executive actions and the concomitant United Nations resolutions. He 
fulfilled his Com m ander-in-Chief duties by directing the Armed Forces sent to the 
Persian G ulf region. He performed his Chief Diplomat responsibilities through 
enlisting Allied countries to lobby Congress for the approval o f using American 
Armed Forces in combat operations. He executed his Chief Executive functions by 
seeking congressional support for his military actions as mandated in the Constitution. 
He acted the part o f Legislative Leader in shepherding the legislation through 
Congress which sought approval for the UN resolutions dictating the possible use of 
military force in the Persian Gulf area. Finally, he assumed the opinion/ party leader 
mantle by rallying both his party and the public behind his policy. So a president 
could be performing one or a given number o f the roles simultaneously depending 
upon the circumstances.
The presidency will be studied in terms of role evaluation within two presiden­
tial domains, namely, C hief Executive and Chief Diplomat. It is crucial to stress that 
these are not the only two roles that could be devised for evaluating presidential
policymaking. As noted previously, a president can be properly viewed as simulta­
neously engaging in a myriad number of roles depending upon the situation. For the 
purposes o f this project, these two roles are utilized in order to emphasize the roles 
that have become prominent in the presidential formation of current environmental 
policy. M oreover, the application o f the five determinants will illustrate how both 
roles take on wide and eclectic policy dimensions. For example, when a president is 
performing his chief executive responsibilities, his actions are shaped by such 
considerations as his constitutional authority, the number of individuals involved in 
his decision making, the advice of his cabinet, public opinion, and whether a crisis is 
at hand. These considerations demonstrate how roles are adapted to different studies 
of presidential policymaking depending upon the purposes o f the author. W ithin the 
confines o f this project, the application o f the five determinants will reveal how a 
president will perform  opinion/party leader-type and legislative leader-type responsi­
bilities while engaged in chief diplomatic or chief executive responsibilities.
While the roles are the primary analytical typologies, an initial test o f the 
determinants which act as the calculus for ascertaining presidential potential and 
power, must be made, especially if we are to transfer the framework to substantive 
policy areas, such as the environment, to test the strength of the presidency. Included 
in the framework are five determinants which seem vital to determining the power 
available to the president in performing his roles. This approach has utility when 
applied to any incumbent during most historical periods; and, regardless o f the scope 
of government activity, it provides a balanced and comprehensive theory of presi-
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dential power.
Our investigation is based on two key presidential roles: C hief Diplomat and 
Chief Executive. A role can be properly understood as a regularly recurring pattern 
o f social interaction that can be described by (1) who expects (2) whom (3) to do 
what (4) in which situation.11 The employment o f role analysis is prevalent in the 
literature for the presidency. Roles are central in texts written by Clinton Rossiter, 
Edward Corwin and Louis Koenig, among others. The scholars within this valuative 
tradition view roles as jobs or functions; they also concur that certain roles are 
earmarked in the Constitution (ie .,C hief Executive) whereas others have evolved upon 
the president (ie.,Party  Leader).
For the purposes o f this work, a role is that set of expectations by other 
political elites and the citizenry which defines the scope o f presidential responsibilities 
within a given sphere o f action .12 Each of the two roles emphasized within this 
project can be identified with a general sphere of action. Chief Executive refers to 
the complex and ever-changing relationship o f the president to his bureaucracy, the 
advisory system, and to the administration o f public policy. The title C hief Diplomat 
refers to our nation’s relationship within the international arena as largely defined by 
the president.
T H E  FIV E D ETERM IN A N TS O F  PR ESID EN TIA L PO W E R
The dynamics between five factors: authority, decision making, public input, 
expertise and crisis, determine the political resources available to a president in each
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role. The reality that these factors have differential impact on each role explains why 
a president is more powerful in some roles than in others. Here is a summary o f the 
determinants:
AUTHORITY
Authority can be recognized as the main determinant of presidential power.
We can speak o f authority to the extent that power has been "routinized" by Constitu­
tional mandate, statutory delegations, judicial precedent, and customary practice. 
Furthermore, such authority can be passed on from president to president and 
expanded, unless Congress passes new legislation or the federal courts reinterpret 
law. It is possible to gauge how much authority the president enjoys in each role by 
studying the Constitution, judicial precedent, statutory delegations, and customs as 
they have evolved historically. Customs are authoritative in the sense that they are 
accepted by the public, opinion leaders, and other branches of government. For 
instance, the cabinet flourishes as a function o f custom and not constitutional man­
date.
DECISION MAKING 
The president’s power is influenced by the number of decision makers 
involved in creating and executing policy. His power is increased when he shares 
decision making with few other political actors or centralizes it in and through the 
Oval Office. The degree to which the president uses decision making capabilities and
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processes to wield more power, either as chief diplomat or chief executive, can he 
important in determining their overall effectiveness and assertiveness in a policy area. 
Thus, as chief diplomat, a president must address the constitutional duties given to 
Congress in foreign affairs. However, as chief executive, the president must contend 
with more actors. This includes his advisors, Congress, the courts, the bureaucracy, 
governors, and special interest groups. The implementation of federal law often 
requires the cooperation of these political actors to some degree. The president 
simply wields more decision making power within the chief diplomat role relative to 
the chief executive role.
PUBLIC INPUTS
While the president must rely upon close advisors in the decision making 
process he must also consider those political actors who act as checks on his influ­
ence. The president’s policy options are determined by the level o f political mobiliza­
tion and deference to the president’s viewpoint by the people and various interest 
groups, also known as public input. For example, public opinion tends to rally 
around the president when he acts as Com m ander-in-Chief or, in many instances.
Chief Diplomat. In contrast, the role o f Chief Executive is more beholden to the 
maneuvering o f clientele groups who jockey to maintain privileged access to govern­
ment. The influence of public opinion varies from one role to the other, but remains 
a litmus test, depending on the incumbent o f the public’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
with policy initiation.
EXPERTISE
A president’s power also depends on situations requiring expertise, either his 
own or his most immediate set o f advisors and their set of resources. Needless to 
say, expertise varies from one Presidency to another and from one situation to 
another. Expertise refers to any use of information that prevents a president’s critics 
from challenging his policies and actions, including secrecy and data m anipulation, as 
well as expert testimony. Expertise aids presidential policymaking only insofar as 
other policymakers and citizens acknowledge its direct relevance to policy formation.
As Chief Diplomat, expertise can be vital since a president has near exclusive 
access to information sources and is able to classify data. Documents such as the 
Pentagon Papers demonstrate the crucial role o f expertise can be in foreign affairs.
It may be argued that expertise is a less important determinant in the Chief 
Executive role than it is within the Chief Diplomat role. The President can rely on 
Congressional feedback in the formulation of proposals such as the budget. M ore­
over, public and private institutions play a pivotal role in the implementation of 
executive policy, thus diminishing this factor in other roles.
CRISIS
Crisis enhances a president’s power and his ability to shape policy particularly 
under conditions o f armed conflict. Crises can provide novel opportunities for a 
President, allowing him to exercise power beyond expected norms, and maximize the
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rallying effect generated by the general public.
As Chief Diplomat, the President may be in a position to protect our national 
interest. In this role, a crisis can quickly m obilize consensus and a feeling that 
decisive action is needed. Likewise, for the C hief Executive, crisis can lead to 
greater exercise o f presidential power in order to meet domestic turmoil. In this 
regard, the Taft-Hartley Act enables the President to delay strikes for 80 days should 
they endanger the nation. Crises provide unique opportunities for presidents to 
enhance their power and fulfill policy demands.
DETERM INANT OVERLAP 
The five determinant categories are not mutually exclusive. In fact all five 
determinants could be operative simultaneously when the executive is engaged in the 
political calculus o f constructing policy. In certain situations, the decision making 
and expertise determinants overlap the authority determinant. This became apparent 
when Bush adopted the strategy advocated by his close advisors to circumvent the 
very Clean Air Act provisions he previously endorsed. The determinants are useful 
guides for analyzing the parameters o f presidential power and its relation to policy 
making but it is important to keep in mind the determinants do not precisely divide 
the open-ended and sometimes puzzling aspects o f executive policymaking.
POLICY ENDS
In order to analyze and assess environmental policymaking within the exccu-
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live branch o f the federal government, policy ends must be defined. In the instant of 
this project policy ends, will be defined as the stated goals o f the two case areas 
which will be discussed. In the case area of the Earth Summit at Rio the policy ends 
will be defined in terms o f the sum m it’s stated goals as delineated by the UN General 
Assem bly’s Resolution 44/128, which stipulated the sum m it’s purpose was to elabo­
rate strategies and measures to halt and reverse the effects o f environmental degrada­
tion in the context of increased national and international efforts to promote sustain­
able and environmentally sound developments in all countries. In the case area o f the 
Clean Air Act the policy ends will be defined as the legislation’s clean air goals.
These goals will be elaborated upon in the third chapter.
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THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY
An analysis o f George Bush’s environmental record requires a brief overview 
of the Reagan adm inistration’s environmental performance. The reasons for this are 
self-evident since environmental protection cannot be conveniently parceled out into 
the four year increments o f a presidential term. The political and administrative 
legacy o f the Reagan years had significantly defined the parameters George Bush 
developed his environmental agenda. But more importantly, the actual condition of 
the environm ent throughout the 1980s had dictated many of Bush’s environmental 
policy decisions. This is true despite Bush’s 1988 campaign efforts to distance 
him self from  the Reagan adm inistration’s ideological and political indifference toward 
environmental concerns. M oreover, the annual federal budget deficit had also 
constrained Bush’s ability to act on environmental problems. Thus the two Reagan 
terms set the tone for Bush’s first term  on environmental policy.
President Bush inherited an array of environmental problems due primarily to 
eight years o f Reagan’s fundamentally negligent presidential leadership toward the 
environm ent. Reagan’s environmental mismanagement plagued his administration 
from its inception.
Not since the New Deal had any president attempted to redirect American 
government in such a drastic manner. Reagan believed the government itself was the 
source o f many of the country’s problems. This belief viewed the growth of the 
federal government and its regulatory functions as crippling political liberty and 
warping the social fabric and economic health of the nation.
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In order to remedy the economic and social maladies throughout the country, 
Reagan targeted the laws developed during the 1970s that covered consumer protec­
tion, energy conservation and the environment. Such laws symbolized and epitomized 
an unnecessary hindrance on the economy resulting in poor economic competitiveness 
and lessened international prestige.
During the 1980 campaign, Reagan emphasized the theme of revitalizing the 
economy-through the relaxation o f environmental laws and regulations. Campaign 
tactics ranged from criticizing the Clean Air Act (which was the target in Reagan’s 
infamous statement that trees were a m ajor generator o f air pollution) to an endorse­
ment o f the sagebrush rebels, a group o f ranchers, mining interests and local politi­
cians from  several western states who advocated that federal public lands be turned 
over to their private control. These campaign efforts were spelled out in the Republi­
can platform of "[declaring] war on government overregulation" and the need for 
"cost-benefit analysis o f m ajor proposed regulations."
President Reagan’s approach to environmental policy was subordinated to key 
overriding economic and political objectives. Environmental programs in themselves 
received marginal focus and were mostly viewed as targets for deregulation efforts. 
This new de-emphasis on environmental policy was embodied in the newly composed 
Council on Environmental Q uality’s first report. The principles to direct environm en­
tal policymaking included:
(1) use of cost-benefit analysis to determine the value of 
environmental regulations;
(2) reliance as much as possible on the free market to
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allocate resources;
(3) decentralizing environmental responsibilities to the 
states;
(4) continuation o f cooperation with other nations to solve 
global environmental problem s.13
The administration vigorously pursued the first three goals and ignored the 
fourth one until the second term.
One of Reagan’s first priorities was the creation o f the Task Force of Regula­
tory Relief headed by Vice President Bush. During its initial two years of existence, 
the task force reviewed hundreds o f new and existing environmental regulations, 
rescinding some and returning many others to EPA and other agencies for further 
study and m odification.14 In February 1981 the president issued Executive Order 
12291, which required cost-benefit analysis o f all proposed regulations. The order 
mandated:
[t]o the extent permitted by law, all agencies must 
adhere to the order’s substantive criteria in their 
regulations.
These include: (1) refraining from regula­
tory action unless potential benefits outweigh 
potential costs to society; (2) choosing regulatory 
objectives that maximize net benefits to society;
(3) Selecting the alternatives that will impose that 
least net cost to society while achieving regulatory 
objectives; and (4) setting regulatory priorities to 
maximize aggregate net benefits to society, taking 
into account factors such as the condition o f the 
national economy and o f particular industries.15
All agency decision making was thus filtered through economic criteria. New 
regulatory proposals were required to be submitted to the newly formed Office of
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Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within OMB. This process became a 
primary method for arresting the creation of new regulation.
Previous presidents had attempted to establish centralized controls over the 
bureaucracy but Reagan’s efforts to create an administrative presidency went much 
fu rther.1'1 Reagan attempted to secure loyalty to his ideology and program via metic­
ulously screening political appointees to agency positions. He appointed unapologetic 
conservative ideologues such as Anne Gorsuch (later to become Anne Burford in 
1983) to head the EPA and James W att to head the Interior Department, as well as 
other conservative ideologues to vital positions throughout the government. Most of 
these appointees came from private enterprise or legal foundations and firms that had 
opposed various environmental regulation efforts. Very few had sympathy or 
experience in environmental matters. The result in the early years was a highly 
politicized and ideological form of environmental administration that drove many 
senior executives and professionals out of the environmental agencies.17
This hostile and ideologically charged approach toward environmental policy 
formation resulted in pitched political battles during the first three years of the Reagan 
administration that culminated in the forced resignations o f both Burford and Watt in
1983. Burford resigned because a House committee sought to subpoena documents 
from EPA regarding possible political influence in the distribution of waste cleanup 
funds in California and elsewhere. Acting on White House instructions, she refused 
to release them on the grounds o f executive privilege. This action prompted the 
committee to cite her for contempt o f Congress. As a result, she became the highest
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executive official ever so charged. In the ensuing political showdown, President 
Reagan was forced to relent on the m atter of executive privilege. Burford resigned 
and some twenty other top EPA officials were fired in the spring o f 1983.
W att’s departure came in October 1983, after some impolitic remarks about 
the composition o f a commission set up to investigate his coal-leasing policies. By 
this tim e, however, it was apparent his stewardship at Interior had little public support 
to the point where he became an electoral liability. To many, he had come to 
symbolize the ideological excesses o f the Reagan administration during that point in 
time.
Congress and various interest groups revolted against the Reagan policies from 
their inception. A bipartisan majority opposed revision o f the major environmental 
statutes, leading to a stalemate with the Reagan administration over the amendment of 
the Clean Air Act and other significant laws that were up for renewal between 1981 
and 1984.
Reagan’s initial efforts to achieve meaningful deregulation within the basic 
fram ework o f environmental law actually failed. The political strategy of seeking 
changes through the executive agencies and ignoring environmental constituencies and 
public opinion backfired. Ideological appointees, such as Burford and Watt, proved 
to be embarrassing when the scandals they coalesced threatened to overwhelm the 
W hite House and Reagan’s efforts for re-election. Several prominent conservatives 
such as W illiam Niskanen and Robert Crandall had since indicated the opportunity for 
transform ing environmental regulation was lost due to such political controversies and
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the ensuing pro-environmental backlash. Nevertheless significant environmental 
setbacks occurred. Although the key environmental laws o f the 1960s and 1970s 
remained intact, their implementation and efficacy were undermined by the political 
turmoil at EPA and other parts o f the federal government. Presidential power 
accounted for this development.
President Reagan assumed no notable leadership on environmental issues 
during his second term. However, his administration appointed less controversial 
figures to head the EPA and Interior after the departure o f Burford and Watt. This 
attempt at reconciliation with Congress and environmental constituencies did result in 
some improvement on the adm inistration’s environmental record. For example, 
Reagan’s second term EPA administrator, Lee Thomas, joined forces with the State 
Department to launch a new effort in worldwide environmental diplomacy. Thomas 
and his staff played a pivotal role in negotiations leading to the Montreal Protocol of 
1987, in which thirty nations agreed to reduce chloroflourocarbon (CFC) production 
by 50 percent by 1998. Although this goal will probably be unmet, the Montreal 
accords achieved an important precedent for multinational agreements on environmen­
tal protection and can be properly viewed as the Reagan administration’s most 
beneficial environmental accomplishment.
Otherwise Congress largely ignored the Reagan presidency’s efforts to stymie 
domestic environmental regulatory progress. Several major environmental statutes 
were reauthorized and strengthened, including the Superfund law which Reagan 
threatened to veto and the new Clean W ater Acts which were passed twice over his
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veto. Congress did remain deadlocked in other areas including the Clean Air Act and 
pesticide reform.
TRANSITION TO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
The transition to the Bush administration earmarked a shift in the country’s 
political constellation. Unlike Reagan, Bush did not generate coattails and made no 
Republican gains in the Congress; rather the Democrats increased their margins in 
both houses. Thus, what appeared to be a conservative victory turned into a split- 
level realignment, entrenching each party in control o f a different branch of govern­
m en t.18 President Bush realized some degree of bipartisan support was necessary for 
securing his adm inistration’s policy ends.
Bush possessed the credentials to accomplish such a task. He accrued 
extensive political capital from his career in the House and his various administrative 
and diplomatic posts. He was viewed by many as a pragmatic consensus builder who 
appreciated expertise and competence. This perception was hindered by his loyal and 
positive support for Reagan and his policies. This was true in the field of environ­
mental policy, primarily because o f his role as chairman o f the Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief. For example, the League o f Conservation Voters proved prophetic 
when they rated candidate Bush a "D +  " on the environment at the outset of the 1988 
campaign. His running mate, Dan Quayle, was rated as having one of the worse 
environmental records in the Senate; as senator he voted on the pro-environmental 
side o f key issues only twenty percent of the tim e.1'1 As a result. Bush faced a
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difficult challenge in convincing the electorate he harbored a sincere desire to become 
the "environmental president".
The pledge to become the environmental president evolved during the 1988 
campaign. Bush had been searching for issues in which to distinguish himself from 
Reagan. One issue that constantly surfaced among his campaign advisers was the 
environment. In mid-August, the campaign staff, headed by James Baker and pollster 
James Teeter, decided to schedule Bush for a week of environmental speeches at the 
end o f August and early September.
On August 31, Bush broke symbolically with Reagan’s record on environm en­
tal policy in a surprise speech at the Detroit M etropark, declaring himself an environ­
mentalist in the Teddy Roosevelt tradition. Bush detailed promises that included the 
end o f garbage dum ping by 1991 and to prosecute illegal disposers o f medical waste; 
supported a m ajor national effort to reduce waste generation and promote recycling; 
promised "no net loss" o f wetlands; promise to convene a conference of world leaders 
to discuss global environmental problems during his first year in office; and called for 
strict enforcement o f toxic waste laws, saying EPA should use its authority to "sue 
for triple damages" to force operators to clean waste sites.211
The new emphasis on the environment was also crafted to put his Democrat 
opponent. G overnor Mike Dukakis, and his campaign staff on the defensive. Dukakis 
and the Democrat campaign staff were unprepared for Bush’s environmental attacks 
and were slow in responding. This could be attributed to the Democrat campaign 
staff’s notion the environment was "their" issue. M oreover, they failed to appreciate
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growing public concern about the environment due, in part, to the ongoing drought 
and record summer highs through most o f the country. Bush’s environmental stance 
may have been important in keeping some wavering voters from deflecting to Dukakis 
on the issue.21 All survey evidence indicated that a majority of the American public 
supported a vigorous environmental program either candidate proposed since bread 
and butter issues were the biggest concern for most Americans.
Bush viewed his victory as an approval for his environmental policies and after 
the election acted swiftly to start a dialogue with key environmental and conservation 
groups. He and W hite House counsel, C. Boyden Gray, met with representatives of 
thirty environmental groups who submitted a list o f more than 700 proposals for 
consideration by the new administration.22 The transition process developed smooth­
ly, especially in contradistinction to when Reagan first took office. By the inaugura­
tion, Bush’s environmental agenda, based on his campaign commitments, was 
reasonably well set.23
Bush did set out to make good on his "environmental president" pledge. For 
instance, by December 1988, he nominated W illiam Reilly, president of the W orld 
Wildlife Fund and Conservation Foundation, to head EPA. Reilly’s selection was 
warmly received by most environmental groups and Congress. However, budget 
constraints compelled Bush to hold federal spending in order to hopefully contain the 
budget deficit. Thus his first budget proposal, for FY 1990, called for the same level 
of expenditures for environment and natural resource programs as President Reagan 
had proposed.
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Otherwise Bush sought to quickly establish his leadership over environmental 
policy by proposing specific policy initiatives. Bush realized a new president usually 
has to act promptly during the first year in office if he is to achieve m ajor domestic 
policy reform .24 Ironically, the Bush administration held up negotiations for an 
international conference on global warming until it was embarrassed by revelations 
that OMB had ordered one of the governm ent’s top scientists, Dr. James Hansen of 
NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, to weaken his testimony before Con­
gress on the greenhouse effect. W hen informed o f this, the president quickly 
reversed the adm inistration’s position and called for a workshop on global warming to 
be held in W ashington.25 This gesture proved to haunt Bush toward the end o f his 
one term presidency.
This episode and others exposed deep rifts within the Bush administration over 
national and international environmental policy. The Energy, Agriculture, and 
Commerce Departments, along with the OMB, had often opposed EPA’s ideas in 
cabinet meetings. OMB director Richard Darman, a Reaganite holdover, advocated 
Bush should jettison his environmental president pledge since the administration could 
"never make nature lovers a Republican constituency".2(1 Nevertheless Bush sought 
to achieve substantive environmental policy changes to make good on his pledge.
This was demonstrated by the most significant environmental initiative taken 
during the first year: Bush’s plan for revising the Clean Air Act, unveiled at a press 
conference on June 12, 1989, to which environmental representatives were invited.
The proposal reflected a protracted clash o f interests within the administration that
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was finally resolved in favor of EPA chief Reilly by the president and chief o f staff, 
John Sununu.27
These proposals constituted what Bush identified as a new environmental 
philosophy consisting o f five goals:
(1) to harness the powers of the marketplace.
(2) to encourage local initiative.
(3) to emphasize prevention instead o f just cleanup.
(4) to foster international cooperation.
(5) to ensure strict enforcement; "polluters will pay".28
The third and fifth points confirmed significant distancing from the Reagan adm inistr­
ation’s approach to environmental policy formation.
The Bush clean air proposals had three main goals: (1) to control acid rain by 
reducing sulfur dioxide (S02) emissions from coal-burning power plants by 10 million 
tons (nearly half) and nitrogen oxide (N 02) emissions by 2 million tons by the year 
2000; (2) to reduce urban air pollution (especially ozone and smog) enough to meet 
clean air standards in all but twenty cities by 1995 and in all cities within twenty 
years; (3) and to reduce emissions o f airborne toxins by 75-90 percent by 2000.
Bush’s Clean Air Act proposals were almost immediately subject to attacks 
from industry. The bill sent to Congress on July 21 was weaker than the original 
proposal on several points, and the W hite House subsequently failed to defend its 
provisions on clean automobile fuels.2''
Bush did elevate environmental policy after a decade of neglect. Ultimately
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this new focus proved to be a chimera dictated by public opinion and electoral 
motivations. His first m ajor environmental proposal, drastic revision o f the Clean Air 
Act, was both innovative and visionary.30 But future developments reversed environ­
mental advances on clean air.
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CHAPTER II
PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE CHIEF DIPLOMATIC ROLE: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE AT THE 1992 EARTH SUMMIT IN
RIO
OVERVIEW
An assessment o f Bush’s actions as Chief Diplomat across the five determ i­
nants of power and analyzing the intended and perceived actions and the extent they 
affected presidential policymaking at the Rio Conference will reveal how Bush 
exercised presidential power in achieving policy goals.
BACKGROUND
From June 3-14, 1992, the wide-ranging, highly publicized UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) - the "Earth Summit" - was held in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil. The Earth Summit confirmed the reality that protection o f the local 
as well as the global environm ent must be integral to the development process 
throughout our increasingly interdependent w orld .1 M oreover, UNCED marked the 
20th anniversary o f the UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stock­
holm in early 1972. The Stockholm meeting was the first global conference on the 
environment - in fact the first world conference to focus on a single issue. Stockholm 
marked the arrival of the contemporary environmental era and because it parallels 
UNCED in important aspects it is essential to address what developed in Stockholm.
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Acting on a proposal from Sweden, the UN General Assembly called for an 
international conference to examine, "[p]roblems of the human environm ent...and also 
to identify those aspects o f it that can only, or best be solved through international 
cooperation and agreem ent".2 One hundred and fourteen governments sent delega­
tions to Stockholm. The entire Eastern bloc boycotted the conference since East 
Germany was excluded because o f extant political conflicts over the postwar division 
of Germany. The conference produced a Declaration on the Human Environment, an 
Action Plan for the Human Environment, and a Resolution on Institutional and 
Financial Arrangements. The Stockholm declaration contains 26 principles concern­
ing the environm ent and development, many of which had not yet been formally 
recorded in internationally recognized texts. Principle 21, in particular, is considered 
by international lawyers to have served as a precedent for much o f the environmental 
diplomacy o f the past two decades; it acknowledges states sovereignty over national 
resources but stipulates that states have "[t]he responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdictional control do not cause damage to the environment o f other 
states or o f areas beyond the limits o f national jurisdiction".1 The Action Plan 
contained 109 recommendations spanning six broad issues : human settlements, 
natural resources management, pollution o f international significance, educational and 
social aspects o f the environment, development and environment, and international 
organizations.
The legacy of the Stockholm Conference has not been thoroughly analyzed by 
scholars. However, Stockholm did establish the UN Environment Program (UNEP),
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furthered the need for cooperation to reduce marine pollution, and created a global 
monitoring network. These developments have been cited as lasting achievements. 
Several authors have argued that the practice o f preparing for such a tremendous 
conference galvanized public opinion and educated governments about what was then 
an issue o f only recent salience.4
UNCED was organized in part, to coordinate the divergent paths o f environ­
mental protection that nations have forged during the two decades since the UN 
Conference on the Hum an Environment in Stockholm. The industrialized countries, 
to a greater extent, have integrated environmental protection into their policy making 
process. All now feature environmental specialists, legal and political institutions for 
evaluating environmental threats and developing and implementing responses. The 
depth o f environmental policymaking capacity does vary among these countries, but, 
as a group, they have made dramatic progress over the past 20 years.5
The developing world has experienced marginal improvement in their capacity 
to respond to environm ental threats, and none matches the capacities found in the 
environmentally active nations o f the industrialized North. The developing South is 
compelled to view environmental protection inseparably from economic issues. The 
persistence o f severe poverty sustains the continuation o f disease and squalor, 
environmental policies in themselves are unable to enhance either public health or 
natural beauty. Environmental protection in the South is tied down by the lethargic 
pace of economic development. The realization o f this fact undergirded the convic­
tion o f the W orld Commission on Environment and Development that it is. "futile to
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attempt to deal with environmental problems without a broader perspective that 
encompasses the factors underlying world poverty and international equality".'’
In 1987, the commission recommended to the UN General Assembly the 
establishment o f UNCED and the Assembly approved the measure in December 1989. 
Stockholm veteran M aurice Strong o f Canada was named secretary-general of the 
conference. General Assembly Resolution 44/228 which initiated the conference, 
states that U N C ED ’s purpose was to "elaborate strategies and measures to halt and 
reverse the effects o f environmental degradation in the context o f increased national 
and international efforts to promote sustainable and environmentally sound develop­
ment in all countries".7
M ost o f the preliminary work for the conference was conducted by the 
Prepatory Com m ittee (PrepCom), which held an organizational meeting in March 
1990 and four substantive sessions from August 1990 to April 1992.x The majority 
of the negotiating was conducted during the fourth and final PrepCom , the "New 
York M arathon", where consensus was reached on the Rio Declaration and on about 
85 percent o f the text o f Agenda 21. The balance, including the controversial items, 
were forwarded to Rio for negotiation under the strict deadline imposed by the arrival 
of most heads o f state and ministers at the end o f the conference. Also scheduled for 
signing at UNCED were two environmental treaties that had been negotiated separate­
ly and concluded in Spring 1992 on climate change and biodiversiy and a nonbinding 
statement o f forest principles resurrected from the wreckage of a failed earlier attempt 
to negotiate a treaty on forests.
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The formal intergovernmental UNCED process produced five documents 
signed by heads of state: the "Rio Declaration"; a statement of broad principles to 
guide national conduct on environmental protection and development; treaties on 
climate change and biodiversity; a statement of forest principles, and "Agenda 21" a 
massive document presenting detailed workplans for sustainable development through­
out the 21st century, including goals, responsibilities and estimates for funding.
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RIO DECLARATION 
The Rio Declaration was originally conceived o f as an "Earth Charter," a 
statement o f environmental principles for national behavior: although the Rio 
declaration was the only unbracketed text to emerge from the PrepCom  meeting, 
rumors spread throughout UNCED that the United States governm ent would reopen 
negotiations on the declaration. The strongest U .S. objection was to principle 23, 
which called for the protection o f the environment and natural resources o f "people 
under oppression, domination, and occupation". In a late compromise involving the 
United States, Israel, and the Arab states, this phrase was retained in the declaration 
but all references to people under occupation was removed from Agenda 21. The 
United States accommodated its other objections by issuing a statement of its reserva­
tion to several principles, including the right to development, which it said could be 
used to justify human-rights violations, and the principle o f "differentiated responsibil- 
ites".
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CONVENTION on CLIM ATE CHANGE 
Because of U N CED ’s political prominence, many other international environ­
mental debates were merged into the proceedings. These included those o f the 
conventions on climate change and biodiversity, which were not negotiated at 
UNCED or in the PrepCom meetings but were signed in Rio following separate 
negotiations. In the case o f the Convention on Climate Change, the UN General 
Assembly passed a resolution in December 1990 that launched the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee (INC). After five negotiating sessions however, discussions 
stalled between the United States and other industrial countries, particularly those of 
the European Community which argued that the convention should contain specific 
commitments to limit emissions of carbon dioxide - at present the largest contributor 
to human-induced changes in radiative forcing -to 1990 levels by 2000. The United 
States argued that such limits were prem ature and lacked sufficient scientific evidence 
and that any controls should be enacted comprehensively on all gases altering the 
climate.
INC Chairman Jean Ripert o f France broke the deadlock last May by drafting 
a compromise document that required industrial countries to design national emission 
limits and emission inventories and to report periodically on their progress, without 
targets or dates. Instead of detailed commitments, the countries would accept a circu­
itously worded goal of returning their greenhouse-gas emissions to "earlier levels" by 
the turn o f the century. All the key participants accepted the convention, which was 
finalized in May 1992, so that there would be a treaty to sign in Rio. Although the
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treaty lacked specific emission targets it contains a very strong objective: "stabiliza­
tion o f greenhouse-gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system ...w ithin a time frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally".9
CONVENTION on BIODIVERSITY 
Discussions for a convention on biological diversity, or biodiversity, which 
concluded on May 22, 1992 in Nairobi, were initiated in 1988 by the United Nations 
Environment Program ’s (UNEP) Governing Council. The issues o f biodiversity and 
biotechnology were originally treated by separate working groups, but were combined 
to be addressed by a single intergovernmental negotiating committee in 1991, over the 
objections o f the United States and other nations. The treaty features three goals: the 
conservation o f biological diversity, the sustainable use o f biological diversity, and the 
fair sharing of products made from genestocks.
The negotiations were hampered by conflict over the financial mechanism, the 
sharing o f benefits, and biotechnology regulation. For example, France threatened 
not to sign because it did not incorporate a list o f global biodiversity-rich regions; 
Japan threatened not to sign because it opposed biotechnology regulation. At the last 
stage, both relented, and only the United States refused to sign the treaty because 
officials believed that the financial mechanism represented an open-ended commitment 
with insufficient oversight and control; that the benefit-sharing provisions were 
incompatible with existing international regimes for intellectual property rights and
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that the requirement to regulate the biotechnology industry would needlessly stifle 
innovation. Although only 30 ratifications were required for it to enter into force,
153 nations signed the convention in Rio.
FOREST PRINCIPLES
Since an early attempt to negotiate a treaty on the protection of global forests 
failed, the PrepCom added a legally nonbinding declaration on forests to its own 
agenda. Although some delegations advocated adding a statement to the forest 
principles that either explicitly called for or excluded a future treaty, the final 
document merely commits governm ents to keeping the principles "under assessment 
for their adequacy with regard to further international cooperation on foreign is­
sues" .10
AGENDA 21
Agenda 21 is the sole document signed at UNCED that attempts to embrace 
the entire environment and development agenda. It is also the largest product of 
UN CED , comprising 40 chapters and 800 pages and states goals and priorities 
regarding a dozen m ajor resource, environmental, social, legal, financial, and 
institutional issues.
Agenda 21 is not a legally binding document but a "work plan," or "agenda 
for action," with a political comm itm ent to pursue a set of goals. It has become "soft 
law," since the UN General Assembly adopted it in fall 1992. Agenda 21 included
estimates of the annual costs o f its program s in developing countries from 1993 to 
2000, o f which about $125 billion per year will be requested from industrial coun­
tries. Agenda 21 also recommends industrialized countries to contribue 0.7 percent of 
their GNP toward Agenda 21 goals. The United States has not made any com m it­
ments to increase ODA (official development assistance) levels to 0.7 percent, and 
have not shown any signs o f fulfilling them.
49
APPLICATION OF THE FIVE DETERM INANTS TO THE CH IEF DIPLOM ATIC 
ROLE IN THE CASE AREA OF BU SH’S POLICYM AKING AT TH E RIO 
CO NFERENCE
AUTHORITY
In terms o f the president’s chief diplomatic duties, the Constitution of the 
United states constructs a partnership between the legislative and executive branches 
in the conduct of foreign policy. Among the shared powers is the prerogative to join 
in the establishment of commitments abroad, as expressed in the treaty-making 
provisions o f Article II, section 2 of the Constitution, the only explicit reference to 
international treaty-making in the founding documents. This passage states that the 
president "shall have power by and with the advice of the senate to make treaties, 
provided two-thirds o f the senators concur..."
The role of the president and his subordinates in the executive branch has 
always been substantial in the making of treaties, reaching beyond the brief statement 
o f Article II, Section 2. Hollis Barber describes the president’s influence:
It is on his initiative and responsibility that the 
treaty-making process is undertaken; he deter­
mines what provisions the United States wishes to 
have embodied in the treaty; he decides whether 
reservations or amendments that the senate atta­
ches to a draft treaty are acceptable to him and 
should be submitted to other parties to the treaty; 
and even if the senate by two-thirds vote approves 
a treaty that he has negotiated, he may, influenced 
by changes o f heart or political conditions, decide 
not to ratify it, and at the last minute file it in his 
wastebasket."
The final ratification o f a treaty, then lies within the power of the President
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and not, as commonly misconceived, the Senate. He is the official who issues the 
formal statements indicating that the United States considers a treaty in effect and 
binding.
The president does exercise significant powers although the language o f Article 
II, Section 2 is unequivocal. The Founders made unmistakably plain their intentions 
to withhold from the president the power to enter into treaties by h im self.12 The 
Senate was designed to be a strong partner in the making of commitments overseas; 
yet in recent decades, presidents - and subordinates within the executive branch - have 
often involved our nation in foreign obligations without the advice and consent of the 
Senate or the Counsel o f the House. Originally designed to be the method to reach 
agreements with other nations, the number of treaties ratified has been few. Through 
the aegis o f broad constitutional claims, the executive branch has unilaterally entered 
into several international pacts, without Congressional input or perceived interference.
One notable example comes from the administration o f Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
The president signed an agreement in 1940 with Great Britain (anticipating a German 
invasion) to provide fifty destroyers in return for selected British naval bases through­
out the Caribbean. Such a broad commitment provided legal grounds for a German 
declaration of war against the United States. The treaty process was circumvented: 
the president’s signature sealed the pact. The method Roosevelt used had the effect 
o f eroding the agreement-making procedure established by the Constitution. This 
solitary incursion on the Senate’s treaty powers provided a precedent for further 
inroads, from military and economic commitments abroad to those dealing with
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transportation, communications, and several other policy a reas.13
W hile the president continues to exercise broad discretion in the area of treaty 
making, Congress is able to influence and participate in contemporary agreement- 
making endeavors. Congressional responses to executive excesses during the Vietnam 
era account for some of the executive-congressional cooperation in key foreign policy 
initiatives. After countless individual expressions o f dissatisfaction over presidential 
dominance in the conduct o f the Vietnam W ar, statutory efforts toward a foreign- 
policy partnership between the branches has evolved to a limited degree. For 
example, the Case-Zablocki reporting requirements enacted in 1972 which require the 
Department o f State to report all statutory and executive agreements to Congress 
within sixty days, have altered the executive’s ability to minimize Congressional 
influence in the crafting o f foreign agreements.
President Bush exercised his authority at UNCED with almost no congressio­
nal cooperation. M oreover, Bush utilized his treaty-making authority within the vast 
confines o f constitutional mandate, statutory allocation and customary practice, to the 
extent necessary he believed his domestic political situation required. He signed only 
the pacts he deemed harmless to his domestic fortunes and ignored agreements viewed 
as detrimental.
Bush chose an unfortunate path to direct his presidential authority. The United 
States is viewed as the single superpower on the planet in the post-Cold war era and 
is accordingly in a unique position to influence most significant international agree­
ments unlike any other nation. UNCED provided an opportunity for the US to exert
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its prestige on global environmental policy.
International conferences and institutions are only as effective as governments 
choose to make them. International efforts to promote environmental protection have 
been most effective when they enhance governmental concern, provide a forum for 
governments to harmonize international policies, and improve international capacities 
to cope with environmental th reats.14
Bush opted not to use his presidential authority to advance US leadership on 
the agreements addressed at UNCED. On the contrary, heads o f state, environmental 
activists and United Nations officials called in every chit and twisted every arm to 
encourage George Bush to attend the Earth Summit. What would be the point o f a 
conference on the future of the planet, after all, if the globe’s only superpower stayed 
home? Bush did choose to attend the conference but Rio partisans swallowed a bitter 
pill.
Bush adopted an intransigent approach to the summit. His domestic concerns 
dictated to a notable degree the United States resistance to several key agreements. 
Bush exercised his authority toward such an end. First, the W hite House weakened 
the climate-change pact, angering European countries that wanted an agreement with 
teeth. Then the administration refused to sign the biodiversity treaty, which is 
supported by more than 120 nations from Germany to India to Brazil, and publicly 
snubbed its own delegation chief when he made a last-ditch attempt to get the White 
House on board. Finally, to cap o ff the chaos. Washington sprang a June surprise: a 
forest-preservation proposal that alienated just about everyone.
This brittle and hardened use o f authority resulted in a noticeable loss of 
global stature for the United States. The United States alienation o f other countries 
included m ajor allies. Razali Ismail, M alaysia’s U .N . ambassador observed: "We 
believed this [summit] could be a shining example of North-South cooperation. [The 
[American actions] go against the whole spirit of what we are trying to do h e re" .ls
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DECISION MAKING
President Bush possessed a virtual monopoly on the decision making process at 
the Earth Summit. He channeled most decision making functions through the Oval 
Office. Political actors, except for top cabinet officials and congressional partici­
pants, played marginal roles in the decision making before, during, and after the 
summit. The ability to centralize decision making stems from the president’s treaty 
making authority.
The president’s power is affected by the number o f policymakers involved in 
formulating and implementing a given policy. His power is strengthened when he 
shares decision making with few other political actors.16 This notion originates from 
E .E . Shattschneider’s contention that, as the "scope o f conflict affecting an issue 
increases, the expansion in the num ber o f participants in that dispute precludes its 
control by any group of decision m akers".17 Congressional efforts to persuade 
President Bush to attend the conference demonstrate how other political actors were 
distanced from the decision making efforts.
On April 7, 1992, the Senate approved a non-binding resolution urging 
President Bush to assume a leadership role at the Earth Summit. The resolution (H 
Con 292) was passed 87-11, paralleled the M arch 17th House approved version. The 
Senate measure urged Bush to support international environmental cooperation and 
inject a "strong and active role at U N C E D ".Ix
President Bush was the only leader among the Group of Seven leading 
industrial nations who had not, at that point in time, indicated if he would participate
55
in the conference. The House shared the Senate’s concern about Bush’s possible non- 
attendance at the conference. The Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on W estern 
Hemisphere Affairs approved by voice vote on February 4, 1992 a resolution (H Con 
Res 263) asking the president to personally participate in the conference. Subcommit­
tee Chairm an Robert G. Torricelli, D -N .J., observed, "I believe without [Bush’s] 
active participation, the result o f the conference could be undermined significant­
ly " .14
M oreover, Rep. Henry W axman, D- Calif., in a bid to place Congress at the 
vanguard o f global environmental issues, introduced bill HR 4750 which would have 
mandated reductions in air pollution levels thought to contribute to the greenhouse 
effect. W axman contended, "It is time Congress stepped in to mandate that the U.S. 
take a more responsible position - just as we did in 1990 when the Bush adminis­
tration was unwilling to support strengthening the international program  to protect the 
ozone layer".211
The congressional resolution m irrored the sentiment o f the 157 nations that 
attended the conference. The United States and other participants, had been engaged 
in multitrack negotiations for two years, hoped to produce binding international 
treaties to stem possible climate damage and protect biodiversity and dwindling world 
forests. A major stumbling block had been the Bush adm inistration's refusal to
agree to specific reductions in the U .S .’s carbon dioxide emissions. The administrati­
on ’s resistance was underscored February 6, 1992, when a Gore amendment on the 
National Energy Security Act (S 2166) regarding carbon dioxide drew a veto threat
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forcing Gore to withdraw.
Gore argued, "The United States has been the principal obstacle to progress in 
the negotiations. On some climate change questions, the lineup has been 139 nations 
on one side and the Bush administration on the other. The adm inistration’s role has 
been a d isaster".21
Despite congressional and international pressure, Bush did not immediately 
commit to attending. By March 23, 1992, he noted that he would like to participate 
but was constrained by domestic concerns and the presidential campaign. Bush had 
been buffeted with attacks by conservative presidential challenger Pat Buchanan and 
by Dem ocrats who criticized him for preoccupation with foreign affairs at the expense 
o f domestic problems.
The conference also began one day after the key June 2 California primary, 
which the Bush campaign approached with concern. Although California voters are 
known for supporting environmental issues, some Republican voters were receptive to 
conservative themes such as Buchanan’s "America First" campaign theme. Bush did 
soundly defeat Buchanan in the primary despite early concerns of a possibly embar­
rassing defeat or a razor thin victory.
Congress recognized the adm inistration’s apprehension about attending the 
conference in the context o f the presidential campaign’s political calculus. As Gore 
suggested, "The president and his advisers should not expect criticism from the 
Democrats for taking the trip. One reason we put this measure [S Res 87| forward 
and get bipartisan support was to send that m essage".22
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But a few Republicans found irony in urging Bush to take on m ore foreign 
travel, especially since some Democrats made it a point o f criticism . For instance, 
Robert J. Lagomarsino, R-Calif., argued that Congress had been silent on U. S. 
participation until the February 4th House resolution and added: "Unfortunately, the 
Congress has not been silent on the issue of attacking President Bush on his travels 
outside the country".23
On the Senate side, Sen. M itch M cConnell, R-Ky., raised concerns about the 
potential impact o f the conference on America jobs and successfully offered an 
amendment to the M arch 4, 1992, Senate resolution (S Con Res 89) to discourage 
Bush from committing to any action that would reduce U .S. jobs.24
Despite the overall bipartisan support, all the opponents to the final Senate 
resolution (H Con Res 292) were Republican. Sen. Malcolm W allop, R-W yo., said, 
"If global warming is occurring and it is harm ful, the [Earth Summit] solution, will 
do nothing to solve this partial problem ".25
W allop successfully offered amendments that would call for any additional 
financial contributions from the United States to be voluntary and state that global 
warming is only a partial threat. The Senate added its resolution (S Con Res 89) to 
the shell o f the similar House-passed version.
The House was more vigorous than the Senate in sending Bush a message of 
its own. On February 4, 1992, the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs approved, by voice vote, a resolution (H Con Res 263) asking the 
president to personally participate in the conference. Within threes weeks another
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House panel approved a similar resolution. The Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
Human Rights and International Organizations approved a non-binding resolution (H 
Con Res 2660 by voice vote, calling on Bush to participate in the conference with 
other heads o f state.
The final House version (H Con Res 292) - again approved by voice vote - 
was stronger in tone than the Senate version. Sponsored by House Foreign Affairs 
Committee Chairman Dante B. Fascell, D -Fla., it stated that the United States should 
place a "high priority" on the sum m it’s success through "the personal participation of 
the president of the United States". The final House resolution encompassed the 
previous non-binding resolutions approved by the Foreign Affairs subcommittees.
The limited number o f outside political actors involved in the decision making 
process toward the summit enabled Bush to achieve his policy goals on the domestic 
and international fronts. Ironically, the accomplishment o f the goals did not result in 
the political objectives desired. This unintended outcome of Bush’s decision making 
is reflected in three policy areas. First, Bush and his closest advisors sought to 
project U .S. leadership at the conference despite early resistance to participating and 
adopting policy positions known to oppose the policy goals of the vast majority of 
other countries. Rather than asserting leadership, Bush achieved near universal 
reproach from international governments, outside political actors, and domestic 
constituents. Bush sealed the "green vote’s" opposition and loss key moderate 
support in the 1992 presidential election. The administration’s hard line on the 
environment did not win many votes - and may have even hurt the Republicans.
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EXPERTISE
Out of the five valuative criteria, the expertise determinant perhaps best 
reveals why President Bush’s approach to the Earth Summit was inconsistent and 
puzzling. His vacillating approach confirmed in many people’s minds that Bush was 
"wishy-washy" on m ajor policy issues and conducted U.S. foreign policy at Rio in an 
appalling manner.
In the role o f chief diplomat, the president’s effectiveness is enhanced to the 
extent that decision making requires expertise on two levels. F irst, expertise is 
dependent upon a monopoly o f information sources and knowledge o f technical 
matters. This level o f expertise stems either from his own or on his most immediate 
set of advisors and theory set o f resources. Second, the expertise determinant refers 
to the use of information that denies a president’s critics from being able to assess his 
policies, including data manipulation.
On both levels, President Bush’s lack o f expertise damaged his chief diplomat­
ic powers at the conference. O f course, he did not possess technical knowledge of 
the scientific issues underlying the treaties negotiated at the summit nor was he 
expected to by other political actors and the public. However, his advisors provided 
conflicting views that resulted in a policy nightmare. This conflict originated within 
his own cabinet between his conservative advisors who philosophically opposed the 
summit, and the relatively moderate advisors who recognized the summit as a world 
historical event requiring his active participation and possible forceful leadership.
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His conservative advisors believed his absence from the summit was the best 
policy option. Otherwise a "stand tall" stance at the summit would hopefully salvage 
his reelection bid. They viewed the conference almost exclusively through an election 
lens and opposed most o f the conference’s agenda on ideological grounds.
This conservative opposition within Bush’s cabinet took on different forms 
from different advisors. Opposition to the biodiversity treaty originated from Vice 
President Dan Quayle since the treaty featured the developing w orld’s desire for 
royalties and property rights in return for supplying pharmaceutical companies with 
the genetic wealth of their forests. For example, the treaty would require a company 
that developed a drug from snake venom - as Bristol-Myers Squibb did - to share 
profits with the nation that saved the snake by preserving its habitat.
In an internal m em o, the chairm an o f the Council on Competitiveness, Dan 
Quayle, blasted the biodiversity treaty, partly because it would "facilitate access to 
genetic material for environmentally sound uses, [and] promote fair and equitable 
sharing of. ..benefits arising from the use of genetic m aterials".21’
The director o f the Office o f M anagement and Budget, Richard Darman, 
treated the invitation to Rio the way people react to a postcard urging them to call a 
900 number and find out which o f the three prizes they’ve already w on.27 His 
opposition stemmed from concern about losing conservative and business support.
Other opponents included staffers Bill Kristol and Davis Rivkin, domestic policy 
advisor Teresa Gorman, and economic advisor Michael Boskin.
A sample of the right wing opposition to the conference’s agenda and general
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spirit captures the motives for these advisor’s apprehension about their boss attending 
the conference.
John Creagan, president o f the US Business and Industrial Council, referred to 
the conference as the "Global Meeting o f the New W orld Odor" , since he believed it 
put politics ahead o f science, and wealth redistribution ahead of wealth creation.2S
Murray W eidenbaum, director o f the Center for The Study o f American 
Business, noted " the Bush Administration will have to brace itself for an unprece­
dented, outpouring o f high decibel, self-righteous, unscientific exaggerations. It is 
vital that the United States continues to be the odd man out. There is no benefit from 
joining these other industrialized nations that are trying to carry favor with the poorer 
countries by advocating extreme positions unsupported by science or econom ics".24
The moderate advisor’s believed his absence at the conference would be more 
politically damaging than attendance. They recognized the necessity of U.S. partici­
pation at a world conference on the environment and development in order to insure 
U.S. input on such issues and maintain U.S. leadership within the new world order. 
M oreover, American public opinion, Congress, and most other participating nations 
supported Bush representing the U.S. at the conference. Without his presence, both 
the presidency and the country risked embarrassment on the domestic and internation­
al scene.
After three months o f hesitation, Bush sided with EPA chief William Reilly, 
national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft, and campaign chief Bob Teeter. Reilly was 
the number-one booster since he supported an environmental agenda that could make
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a reality o f Bush’s environmental president pledge. He even went as far as suggesting 
he would resign if Bush did not attend. Scowcroft reasoned it would be a major 
embarrassment for the leader o f a new world order to skip the meeting at which the 
very concept would be shaped. Finally, Teeter thought it made solid electoral sense 
to cloak candidate Bush in green.
Bush him self decided to participate since he probably believed it necessary to 
partake in a forum featuring most of the world leaders. Also the summit provided an 
opportunity to demonstrates he cares about an issue that most people are concerned 
about. And as his campaign chief suggested, it would be a stratagem to deflect 
criticism on him from Bill Clinton and the press.
Both Reilly and Scowcroft invoked the support many business executives 
extended to the conference. The Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
which played a prominent role at Rio, includes the heads o f international corporations 
such as Dow Chemical, DuPont, Chevron, and 3M. This council advocates a 
"responsible" approach to the environment since, "There can be no economic devel­
opment without environmental responsibility". This lent credence to Reilly and 
Scowcroft’s contention that key interests in the business community championed the 
sum m it’s agenda or, at the least, business was not unified in its opposition to the 
conference.
However, Bush predicated U.S. participation on treaty concessions intended to 
win the support o f certain domestic constituents and appease conservative critics. 
Ironically, these concessions accomplished marginal gains amongst conservative
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voters and did not convert any other bloc of voters. Furthermore, Bush confirmed 
the environm entalist’s worse fears about his sincerity on environmental policymaking. 
From  their perspective, his 1988 campaign pledge to be the "Environmental Presi­
dent", became an epitaph o f hypocrisy and vacuity.
Bush mistakenly believed he could appease his conservative critics and gain 
credibility on environmental issues simultaneously. He adopted this line o f action by 
relying on his advisors and seeking to strike a balance between their conflicting 
views. Instead of gaining the best of both worlds, he inherited the worse o f both 
worlds. The expertise gap damaged his presidency.
PUBLIC INPUTS
President Bush’s policy options at the Earth Summit were, in part, dictated by 
the vicissitudes o f public opinion and the pressure o f interest groups. Both played a 
role in Bush’s conduct at the summit.
Three developments revolving around the conference illustrate how public 
inputs shaped Bush’s policy making at the summit. First, he proposed a small fund to 
abet forest protection in order to set forth his own environmental program during the 
election year and possibly placate critics of his environmental policy making .
Second, Bush sought to maintain a reasonable semblance of his pledge to be the 
"environmental president" in order to campaign credibly on environmental issues. 
Finally, public opinion polls reflected public cynicism about Bush’s handling of 
environmental policy.
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Bush’s small fund proposal for rain forests was motivated by the desire to 
shore up his standing with environmentalists who had attacked his recent decision’s 
regarding wetlands, endangered species, and Clean Air Act implementation. M ore­
over, his W hite House advisors believed such a proposal would be Bush’s image- 
sprucing plan for the election. Two days before the earthfest began, Bush proposed 
increasing funds for international forest programs from $1.35 billion to $2.7 billion, 
and upping the U .S. commitment from $150 million a year to $270 million. The 
rationale was sound: because forests store carbon, saving them holds down the carbon 
dioxide that contributes to global warming. And if forests are preserved, so are the 
species that inhabit them.
This proposal was formulated to perform  the dual task of dealing with the 
biodiversity pact and creating a distinct environmental program in time for the 
presidential campaign. However, this policy created befuddlement and failed to 
perform the assigned dual task. To begin with no one in the administration could 
delineate how the funds would be allocated. Would it address so-called root causes of 
deforestation, such as the poverty that forces people to chop trees for fuel? or would 
it buy more Jeeps for foresters to drive around M alaysian clear cuts? Previous 
international forestry plans have left environmentalists skeptical; for example, the 
World Bank has funded "forestry" projects that contributed to deforestation.
Also the policy was not self-imposed on the U.S. revealing Bush as employing 
a double standard. The administration proposal offered new money for tropical-forest 
protection while it continued to permit logging of old-growth forests in the Pacific
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Northwest.
Bush’s efforts to shore up his 1988 campaign pledge to be the "environmental 
president" fell short. During the 1988 race, then Vice President Bush vowed to 
combat the greenhouse effect with the "White House effect", and castigated Governor 
Dukakis for his inability to clean up Boston Harbor. By 1992, Bush emphasized his 
election bid before any specific pledges regarding environmental policy. Between the 
elections Bush did gain good marks for his 1990 Clean Air Act revision efforts but 
had weakened some o f the provisions he supported and thus gained the dismay of the 
public. The Clean A ir Act revisions and other policy decisions left Bush vulnerable 
to attacks about his concern for the environment. He decided attending the Rio 
conference could improve public perception toward his pledge to be the environm ent 
president.
Unfortunately for Bush, his participation at the Rio proceedings did not alter 
public opinion to his advantage. A Tim e/CNN poll conducted in September 1992 
confirmed the public’s skepticism about Bush’s approach to the environment. In this 
poll, half the respondents said the loss o f jobs due to environmental regulations was a 
"big problem ". Yet when asked to choose between protecting the environm ent and 
protecting jobs, 48% chose the environment while 36% chose jobs. Forty percent of 
those questioned said they would be less likely to vote for a candidate if they 
disagreed with his environmental position even if they agreed on other m ajor issues.
Such poll indicators resulted in electoral defeat for Bush, whose credibility on 
the issue was not high. When asked whether they felt Bush lied when he said he
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would be the environmental president, 60% said yes. The figures were larger among 
baby boomers (62%) and independents (63%). Among Republicans, 40% agreed he 
lied about his intentions.
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CRISIS
The president’s ability to mold policy during crisis typically involves condi­
tions o f armed conflict or economic emergency. President Bush’s adept engineering 
of U .S . policy during the Persian G ulf W ar conflict serves as a recent example of 
how a president can exercise significant power in the policymaking process and 
mobilize general public support for a policy. Likewise Franklin D. Roosevelt 
generated the same success for his New Deal legislation during the economic crisis of 
the Great Depression.
The Earth Summit did not present a crisis in the military sense o f the Persian 
G ulf W ar or in the economic sense o f the Great Depression. However, several heads 
of state, various interest groups and segments o f the American view the current status 
o f the global environment as an ongoing crisis or as an imminent crisis. From their 
perspective the summit provided a novel opportunity to address the crisis situation 
involving the climate, biodiversity, endangered species, development in the South, 
and so on. The Bush administration was in a position to adopt a similar perspective 
toward the global environment and thus utilize the prestige o f the White House to 
confront a crisis situation in order to protect the national interest and possibly save the 
world ecosystem. Such an approach may have lent Bush a rallying point for public 
support and provide him with increased power in the area of environmental poicymak- 
ing.
Bush and his advisors failed to capitalize on such a rare opportunity. Bush 
chose to downplay the crisis nature o f the current global environment and opted to
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rely on Vice President Q uayle’s contention regarding the environment. Quayle, as 
previously noted, argued that the existing programs to improve the environment were 
more than adequate; that the state o f Am erica’s air, water, and forests is getting better 
and that further improvements will come at the expense o f jobs.
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CHAPTER III
PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE ROLE - AN ASSESSMENT 
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE 1990
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
OVERVIEW
An assessment o f Bush’s actions as C hief Executive across the five determ i­
nants o f power and analyzing the intended and perceived actions and the extent they 
affected presidential policymaking in the execution o f the 1990 Clean A ir Act 
amendments will reveal how Bush exercised presidential power in achieving policy 
goals.
BACKGROUND
The federal response to air pollution originated in 1955 when Congress passed 
the Air Pollution Control Act. This Act authorized the Public Health Service to 
conduct research and offer technical expertise and financial assistance to the states on 
air pollution matters. The Clean A ir Act of 1963 marked the first major federal 
initiative toward air pollution containment. Congress crafted the Act to protect and 
enhance the quality o f the N ation’s air resources so as to promote the public health 
and welfare and the productive capacity o f its population.1 The Clean Air Act 
enabled federal officials to intervene in interstate air pollution matters only at the 
request o f state governments. However, the mechanisms for enforcing pollution 
abatement were cumbersome and unwieldy which rendered them ineffective. Between
71
72
1965 and 1970, only eleven abatement actions had been initiated under the 1963 
Clean Air A ct.2 Congress amended the Clean A ir Act by authorizing the Air Quality 
Act o f 1967. This legislation directed the secretary o f the Department of Health, 
Education, and W elfare to establish the Air Quality Control Regions (AQCRs).
W ithin each region, states constructed air quality standards and emission standards for 
regulated pollutants. By 1970, o f the ninety-one designated AQCRs in the country, 
only twenty-five had been recognized by the federal governm ent.
These early acts granted state governments wide avenue of discretion with 
respect to air pollution control enforcement. If state governments are granted 
deference, the common pool nature o f environmental pollution problem presents a 
regulatory dilemma. W ithout federal guidelines backed by federal enforcement for 
uniformity, states have the ability to attract industry by using pollution control, or the 
absence o f pollution control, as a selling point to bring industry within their borders. 
Under such circumstances, all states in the region could suffer environmental set­
backs. A state that hopes to limit polluting activities incurs pollution damage from 
their neighbors. A ir pollution does not respect state borders.
The 1970 Clean A ir Act amendments and subsequent amendments in 1977 and 
1990 represented substantial expansion of federal involvement in air pollution 
regulations, especially the common pool problems associated with local control of air 
pollution. The 1970 amendm ents directed the EPA administrator to establish "nation­
al ambient air quality standards " (NA A Q S).1 NAAQS were separated into primary 
and secondary categories. Prim ary standards represent "ambient air quality standards
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and attainment and maintenance o f which in the judgem ent o f the adm inistrator, based 
on such criteria and allowing an adequate m argin of safety, are requisite to protect the 
public health".4 Secondary standards are those necessary to protect the public welfare 
from the adverse effects associated with air pollution.
The 1970 act changes required that uniform  national standards o f performance 
be enacted for new stationary sources o f air pollution and for preexisting sources that 
were modified in a manner that increases the emissions of any pollutant. It also 
required uniform national standards for "hazardous" air pollutants, defined as "Air 
pollution may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality or an 
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating irreversible, illness.5
In 1977, amendments to the Clean A ir Act divided each type o f AQCR that 
was attaining the standard into class I, class II, and class III. Class I regions include 
national parks, wilderness and sim ilar areas. Minute, if any, deterioration in air 
quality is allowed. In class II areas, moderate increases of air pollution are allowed 
as long as the resulting pollution does not exceed the N A A Q S/’
The 1977 Clean Air Act amendments also provided states develop plans by 
1982 that would bring air quality for ozone, carbon monoxide and other pollutants up 
to EPA standards by December 31, 1987. Anticipating difficulty in meeting the 
standard mandated in 1977, Congress debated over amendments to the Clean Air Act 
to reduce the standards or grant extensions every year from 1981 to 1990.
In 1990, Congress passed and the president signed the 1990 Clean Air Act 
amendments. This ended more than ten years o f congressional stalemate over the
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reauthorization o f the Clean Air Act. During the 1980s, a coalition o f utilities, labor 
unions, midwestern politicians, and auto and oil interests successfully prevented any 
strengthening of the Clean Air A ct.7 President Ronald Reagan and Senate Majority 
Leader Robert Byrd opposed new legislation to control air pollution. The election of 
George Mitchell o f Maine as majority leader, a proponent o f a stronger Clean Air 
Act, and President George Bush led the way to tougher legislation.
APPLICATION OF TH E FIV E DETERM INANTS TO TH E C H IEF EXECUTIVE 
ROLE IN TH E CASE AREA OF BU SH’S POLICYM AKING TOW ARD TH E 1990 
CLEAN AIR 
ACT
AUTHORITY
A deep-rooted source o f friction between Congress and the President is control 
of the bureaucracy. For almost two centuries, Congress and the president have 
competed with one another for the power to regulate the activities o f departments and 
agencies. Both branches while operating within limits, have legitimate claim s.s The 
competition between President Bush and Congress over the execution of the 1990 
Clean Air Act amendments was no exception to the pattern o f executive-legislative 
friction.
One constitutional approach posits the president is the chief administrative 
officer o f a unified and hierarchical executive branch, capable o f directing the 
activities and operations o f agency personnel. They serve as the president’s agents in 
maintaining that "the Laws be faithfully executed". But another approach starts with
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the premise that the Congress creates the departments and may specify how laws are 
to be implemented. Hierarchical rules are displaced by a system of spreading power 
and instituting checks.9 The Constitution empowers Congress to make all laws 
"which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the powers vested 
"in the Government o f the United States or in any Department or Officer thereof".
Since the Constitution directs the president to "take care that the Laws be 
Faithfully executed," he does have the power to utilize the bureaucracy to achieve his 
constitutional duties. However, several attorney generals have advised presidents of 
substantial political and legal constraints that limit their ability to intervene in 
bureaucratic departmental matters. Even when the president has the power to control 
the decision o f a departmental head, such intervention may be inexpedient and of 
doubtful proprie ty .10 W hile it is theoretically correct that department heads shall 
discharge their administrative duties in such m anner as the president may direct, it 
was conceded by Attorney General Edward Bates that it is "quite impossible for the 
president to assume the actual direction of the multifarious business of the depart­
m ents".11
On different occasions an attorney general has advised the president that the 
W hite House had no legal right to interfere with administrative decisions. For 
example, President M onroe asked whether he could alter the decisions made by the 
auditors and com ptrollers in the Treasury Department. The advice from Attorney 
General William W irt was forthright: "It appears to me that you have no power to 
in terfere ...If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to perform a duty.
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not only is that officer bound to perform it, but no other officer can perform it 
without a violation o f the law, and were the President to perform it, he would not 
only be taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he would be violating 
them him self".12
Congress may distribute ministerial functions of government among various 
bureau chiefs and executive officials without regard to hierarchical principles of 
public adm inistration.13 Neither the president nor any department head could by any 
degree o f laborious industry, revise and correct all the acts of his subordinates. And if 
he could, as the law now stands, it would be illegal as unw ise".14
In some instances, these legal and formal rules do not prevent the president (or 
Congress) from  interfering with the bureaucracy’s autonomous duties. Intervention 
by presidential aides in rulemaking and adjudication is a subject o f serious concern .15 
OMB and W hite House efforts may appear like reasonable initiatives to coordinate the 
activities o f the executive branch and carry out the president’s programs. But ex 
parte contacts by presidential staffers perm it them to gather information privately 
from industries o f from state officials to communicate such information in closed-door 
sessions with agency decision makers, without the knowledge o f other interested 
parties in the rulemaking process.1'’ Responding to this concern, the Justice Depart­
ment argued in 1979 that there is no prohibition against communication, within the 
executive branch after the close o f the comment period or proposed rules, provided 
that presidential advisers do not serve as a conduit for persons outside the executive 
branch to have ex parte communications with agency staff.17
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The Justice Departm ent’s guideline relies heavily on self-policing and self­
constraint by presidential aides who have a reputation for ignoring procedural 
subtleties that stand in the way of W hite House objectives. There exists a strong 
tradition - expressed in opinions by attorney generals, statutory language, and 
decisions by the federal judiciary - for agency autonomy in adjudication proceedings. 
The rulemaking process, while less formulated and structured than the adjudicatory 
model, also must be conducted in a m anner that observes standards o f openness and 
fairness.18
President Bush exercised his authority in such a manner. Bush successfully 
maneuvered Vice President Dan Quayle, into a position to interfere with and overrule 
agency Clean A ir Act rulemaking and enforcement. Under the guise as chairman of 
the President’s Council on Competiveness, Quayle and fellow Council members were 
able to manipulate ex parte contacts toward suspending and circumventing Clean Air 
Act laws. This use o f presidential authority was perverted to achieve White House 
political objectives.
Quayle served as the patron saint o f American corporations disturbed with 
Clean Air Act regulation. He aided polluters in undermining regulations by changing 
the rules after the Clean Air Act amendments were made law. According to Repre­
sentative Henry Waxman (D-Calif.), chair of the House Subcommittee on Health and 
Environment, "While Mr. Bush cultivates the image of the environment president, his 
vice president is part of a shadow-government that works behind the scenes to help 
polluting industries undermine the law".
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Republican vice-presidents have acted in such a capacity ever since Ronald 
Reagan signed Executive Order 12291 in 1981, claiming for the W hite House the 
power to vet federal regulations for their effect on industrial competitiveness. Then 
Vice President George Bush chaired the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, which 
boasted among its achievements slowing the phase-out of lead gasoline.
The same was continued by the Council of Competitiveness, which among its 
permanent members included the secretaries o f Treasury and Com m erce, the Attorney 
General, the OMB Director and the Chief o f Staff. The council’s closed meetings 
provided a convivial working atmosphere, free from annoying oversight. While the 
OMB is prohibited from direct contacts with industry, the Council on Competitiveness 
suffered no such stricture, making it a pipeline into the federal regulatory apparatus 
for corporate interests.
Thus Quayle, in his capacity as chairman of the council, conferred financial 
favors on industry, on a national scale and with decision making authority the 
Founding Fathers never anticipated.19 Quayle publicly defined his job as keeping the 
United States "number one in the global m arkets," but privately he used the post to 
communicate with secret contacts in industry and to order government agencies to 
weaken or toss out regulations that displeased corporate executives.
Q uayle’s pre-emptive power was so considerable he overrule heads of agencies 
like EPA Administrator William Reilly. The sweeping nature of Q uayle's demands 
began through a memorandum he sent to the heads of agencies and departments on 
March 22, 1991. He wrote, "At a cabinet meeting last summer. President Bush asked
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the Council on Competitiveness to oversee the regulatory review process... 1 appreci­
ate your help to make sure that [this] process operates to minimize the burden on the 
economy of all federal regulations. Henceforth, heads of agencies were to send his 
reviewers any "documents announcing or implementing regulatory policy that affects 
the public". That meant not only drafts of new regulations but also "strategy state­
ments, policy manuals, grant and loan procedures...press releases".2,1
An April 12, 1991 report prepared by the staff of OMB W atch (an activist 
organization in W ashington D .C . headed by Gary Bass) said that Q uayle’s memo 
"caused widespread confusion among federal agencies". OMB W atch observed, "The 
Quayle Council reserves the right to review [agency policy] - a factor that will 
inevitably further politicize agency activities...[The memo] raise the issue o f whether 
the Council intends to take up the role the [Bush] Task Force once played - again 
acting as conduit to industry. Council staff have indicated that they hope to solicit 
and receive comments from those affected by regulatory actions, leaving the door 
open for them to court industry and business interests".
From this starting point, the council’s reworking o f the federal regulatory 
apparatus included the following items:
(1) The council killed a regulation that would have required cities with garbage 
incinerators to recycle a quarter of their trash - even though the W hite House had 
once touted the rule as the solution to the nation’s solid-waste woes. While the EPA 
had previously declared that the regulation "would pass any imaginable cost/benefit 
test", the incinerator industry found it burdensome, and so did the council.
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(2) The council suggested more than a hundred changes to the 1990 Clean Air 
Act, none of which would strengthen it. More potentially damaging, was a proposed 
loophole (phrased as a m inor permit amendment) that would allow companies to set 
their own maximum pollution levels. Should state governments fail to object to a 
com pany’s dream limits within seven days, the permits would automatically be 
revised to suit the polluter’s fancy.
Rep. W axman criticized the council’s actions. He observed: "Not only is this 
horrible policy, it is also flagrantly illegal". He believed Bush should have vetoed the 
Clean Air Act if he wanted to. "But once enacted into the law, he does not have the 
authority to revise or alter the legislation. Nor, needless to say does his vice-presi­
den t" .21
In its efforts to eliminate government imposed burdens on scientific and 
technological progress and to protect private property rights from unwarranted 
government interference, the council ad made itself a final court o f appeals for 
polluters.
DECISION MAKING
The decision making determinant assesses Bush’s ability to deal with other 
political actors in the carrying out o f Clean Air Act provisions. The 1990 Clean Air 
Act amendments required cooperation from Congress, the bureaucracy and subnatio­
nal elites like state governors and legislators. M oreover the role interest groups 
played in the execution of the A ct’s provisions will be addressed. In this way we can
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assess whether Bush achieved the policy goals o f the act through the decision making 
process.
Bush’s approach to Congress was to simply bypass it. This ability stemmed 
from his use and abuse o f presidential authority in authorizing the Council on 
Competitiveness to oversee the regulatory execution o f the act’s provisions. Congress 
viewed this shift in policy implementation as illegal. Henry W axman (D-Ca.), 
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, expressed this 
sentiment during the com m ittee’s hearings. No law gave the council the right to veto 
or undercut a pollution control program  mandated by Congress; there was no Con­
gressional oversight o f his council and no way o f knowing what transpired in the 
council’s communications with the regulated companies. Chairman Quayle even re­
fused to send a representative to testify at the W axman hearings on the council. The 
only legal rationale for the operation was contained in two executive orders signed by 
President Reagan in 1981 and 1985. The purpose o f these orders, as stated in the 
preamble was to "insure well-reasoned regulations".22 A Library o f Congress study 
concluded after Reagan signed the first order that he had exceeded his authority in 
signing it.
Government back-room collaboration with regulated companies now seemed to 
be fully institutionalized in spite o f efforts o f Congress to control it. The influence of 
regulated companies was self-evident in the decision making process. For instance. 
Congress, seeing the failure of earlier clean air efforts, adopted a different approach 
in 1990, telling EPA to set standards that already have the best pollution-control
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technology. The law orders EPA to regulate 189 specific air tonics by source, and 
requires the states to step in with their own rules if EPA is late, a scenario industry 
would oppose.
The new rule would have cut hazardous air emissions by chemical and other 
factories almost in half. According to the EPA this was supposed to have been final 
by November 1992. But by August 1992, the OMB had slated the draft for eight 
months. Since it had not been issued for public comment, EPA could not make the 
deadline. The OMB draft would have covered most big polluters in the chemical 
industry, including divisions o f many m ajor oil companies.
A number o f these companies and their top executives were among the top 100 
contributors to Republican presidential campaigns: Atlantic Richfield (topping out at 
$862,000), Occidental Petroleum , Coastal Corp. and American Petrofina. Others had 
become big Republican donors since 1988; Chevron and one of its top lobbyists have 
given $272,000 since Bush took office. Overall, those companies with a direct stake 
in the conflict over air toxins had given more than $3.2 million to the Republican 
Party between the 1988 and 1992 elections.
The affected industries were concerned about the precedent the rule would set 
as the first major air tonics regulation. The Chemical Manufacturers Association 
(CM A), the American Petroleum  Institute (API), and individual companies immedi­
ately began lobbying the EPA and OMB. Some, including representatives o f Chevron 
and Air Products and Chem icals, had met with EPA staff.
The council was believed to have influenced OMB in shuttling the rule. API
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and others had mentioned the rule in comments on regulatory burdens they confront.
In June 1992, after a protracted squabble between the council and EPA, Bush agreed 
with the council that another Clean A ir Act rule should allow factories to increase 
their emissions above permit levels without notifying the public. Many o f the same 
corporations that lobbied the White House during that debate are also seeking to shape 
the air tonics rule.
"We think [cost considerations] is a complete perversion o f the statute and our 
general counsel has told [OMB] that a couple o f tim es," observed one EPA source 
involved in the process.23
State governments also played an instrumental role in the derailing o f EPA 
execution o f the act’s mandates. As noted previously, Congress gave the EPA two 
years to issue technical and legal regulations covering a host of emissions in order to 
initiate the cleanup process. EPA ’s regulations would then guide states as they create 
plans to reach emission targets. Congress initially appropriated $400 million for the 
act, earmarking $137 million for EPA to give to states as grants.
The state implementation plans are "the heart of the new Clean Air A ct...the 
linchpin on which the whole act rests, " says Deborah Sheiman, resource specialist at 
the National Resources Defense Council (N R D C ).24 However states have a great 
deal of freedom to interpret the federal regulations in preparing the plans, and that 
may have opened the way for tight state budgets and special-interest lobbyists to 
sidetrack the ac t’s designs.
For example, coal-producing Ohio, a state with heavy manufacturing, a
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Republican governor in 1991 who was the bane o f environmentalists, and a coal-based 
electric utility industry, successfully sidetracked the act’s designs. Form er Ohio 
Environmental Council director Steve Sedam thought the motto of the state EPA was 
to "work with polluters" to reduce fines and ease compliance rather than impose fines 
or develop strict compliance procedures.25
Like several states, Ohio faced a severe budget shortfall. As a result the 
general assembly had proposed to cut the Ohio EPA budget 25 percent just as its 
Clean A ir plans were coming due. At the same time, Ohio utilities were lobbying for 
a 135-day limit on the time the state could take to review the permits for solid waste 
generated by scrubbers. This limit would overburden an understaffed EPA. As a 
result Ohio cut corners in implementing the Clean A ir Act, something Congress did 
not plan.
Finally, the EPA  itself was hampered by the resources allocated to itself by 
Congress and Bush. Acting on the will o f Congress was challenging because o f the 
time proven maxim, "You get what you pay for” .
An estimated 2,200 EPA employees work at least part-time on various aspects 
of the act, the quantity o f new regulations and technical analyses threaten to over­
whelm staff, many of whom arrived at the agency as a result of the 1990 amend­
ments. For instance, the acid-rain division did not exist before November 1990. Yet 
states were supposed to cut sulfur-dioxide emissions 40 percent from their 1980 level 
by the year 2000, and Congress gave the division’s 30-plus staff members only until 
September 1991 to propose ways to achieve the goals.
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EXPERTISE
How Bush relied on his advisors (and the information he received from them) 
can provide insight as to why the policy ends of the Clean A ir Act went unfulfilled. 
The authority determinant revealed how Bush utilized nonlegal executive devices to 
sabotage bureaucratic and Congressional efforts to secure the acts’ aims. Both the 
authority and decision making determinants illustrated how Bush pushed his political 
goals over environmental and health objectives. The expertise determinant will 
demonstrate how his advisors treated data and interacted with each other in producing 
the anti-environmental policy.
Bush designed the Council o f Competitiveness to achieve the policy ends he 
believed necessary for his political survival - reelection in the 1992 presidential 
campaign. The original council alone showed the importance Bush attached to it: 
Chairman Dan Quayle, Vice President; John Sununu, W hite House C hief of Staff;
Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General; Nicholas Brady, Secretary o f Treasury; Michael 
Boskin, Council o f Economic Advisers Chair Richard Darman, OMB Director;
Robert M osbacher, Secretary o f Commerce.
M oreover, a key member in the council’s deregulation scheme was C. Boyden 
Gray, presidential counsel to Bush. Gray headed a Quayle working group on 
regulatory policy. G ray’s White House/industry connections go back to the early 
1980s, when he was counsel to the Reagan deregulation task force. At that time Gray 
developed a hit list of regulations destined for oblivion in what became known in 
W ashington as the "black hole". He was instrumental in siding with industry in
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Clean Air disputes and refused to provide information on the council’s actions to the 
Congress or the press.
The council overruled EPA Clean Air implementation efforts. One o f the 
major disputes between W illiam Reilly, the EPA chief, and the council was decided in 
the councils’ favor by Bush since he decided to endorse the council’s actions, 
blocking Clean A ir Act rules that would have required businesses with pollution 
permits to submit to public hearings before increasing their emissions.
Reilly argued citizens must have the chance to challenge any changes contem ­
plated by industry, indeed the act makes it a legal requirement. The Council dis­
agreed, and its word was final. The defeat for citizen participation in enforcing 
environmental policy was serious. Reilly and the vice president made the issue a test 
of wills, and Reilly lost - because o f the president.2f1
Quayle and the council were not qualified to evaluate or revise these sorts of 
regulations, a task that requires expert knowledge o f pollution-control technology and 
the effects of pollution on the human body. Neither were the staff at the OM B’s 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, who reviewed the regulations for 
Quayle and whose specialties were in such areas as economics, public administration 
and law. Quayle and his council relied on the environmental perspectives of industr­
y ’s experts.27
PUBLIC INPUTS
Public opinion did play an important role in Bush’s approach to the Clean Air
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Act. Both Bush’s support for the act’s amendments in 1990 and his subsequent 
efforts in 1991 and 1992 at derailing the amendments were politically motivated at 
gaining public support and reflecting public opinion. W hat distinguished his 1990 
performance from his 1991 and 1992 efforts was that Bush and his advisors gauged 
public opinion better in 1990 than in the latter years. Bush believed assuming a pro­
business stance and an aloofness toward environmental issues would improve his 
chances for reelection in 1992. However, the results o f the 1992 election proved 
Bush’s calculation wrong.
In 1990 Bush recognized public opinion supported tougher environmental laws 
in order to meet environmental problems. Bush and many lawmakers had invested 
substantial political capital in their environmental records.28 And in an election year, 
no one wanted to face the voters empty-handed. Thus the 1990 Clean air A ct’s 
passage could be attributed to broad public support for addressing environmental 
problems.
Beginning in 1991, Bush did an about face and started the process of eroding 
the ac t’s provisions. In part he did this in the belief that this form of deregulation 
would spur the economy out o f the ongoing recession. Also he needed to shore up 
his support among conservatives and business groups angry at his "No new taxes 
reversal at the 1990 budget summit. This culminated in the 1992 campaign strategy 
to portray the Clinton-Gore team as an eco-driven ticket hostile to business and 
potentially harmful to the overall economy. Bush and Quayle wanted to paint 
themselves as business-friendly and better able to handle the economy. Environmen-
tal issues would have to take a backseat to other pressing issues.
Bush relied on his advisors in adopting this policy and campaign approach. 
Unfortunately for him, the public was not receptive to his message. Public opinion 
still indicated support for an improved environm ent even during periods o f anemic 
economic growth. M oreover, the public did not perceive Bush as reliable on the 
environment.
CRISIS
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Enforcement of the 1990 Clean Air Act did not constitute a crisis situation, at 
least in the conventional sense o f the term - a national emergency was not at hand. 
This does not deny some supporters o f the Clean Air Act view current air pollution 
levels as a crisis situation. However, it is difficult to conclude whether an air 
pollution crisis exists and if it does, is it a short-term or long-term one, and is it 
possible to decouple the short-term implications from the long-term implications, etc. 
Regardless o f the scientific com m unity’s consensus and public opinion toward air 
pollution, Bush did not see enforcement o f the act’s provisions as a crisis type 
situation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
C O N C LU SIO N
Through comparing and contrasting the chief diplomatic role and the chief 
executive role it becomes self-evident that President Bush did not achieve his policy 
aims in the environmental area. This analysis will be conducted on the level o f each 
of the determinants.
AUTHORITY
W ithin both roles Bush utilized his authority for political ends and not environ­
mental policy ends. W hen Bush performed the chief diplomatic role at the Rio 
conference he took full advantage o f the authority invested in him to make treaty 
obligations. He refused to sign any o f the original versions o f the pacts negotiated 
despite international and domestic pressure to do so. Unless the pact contained 
provisions that he believed did not interfere with his political survival, he did not 
exercise his authority toward committing to such an agreement.
Likewise Bush did not exercise the authority invested in him to execute the 
Clean A ir Act revisions. He was able to succeed in this endeavor for a few basic 
reasons. First, the constitutional provisions to "execute" laws permits any president 
some latitude in how to carry through the project o f executing. Until a court decision 
or a revision in the affected legislation "checks" the president in this regard, he is
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able to pick and choose how to enforce the law. This aspect o f authority leads to 
another reason why Bush was able to exercise presidential authority to his perceived 
political advantage - neither Congress nor the courts had the authority to call Bush on 
his possible Clean Air Act circumventions before he lost his re-election bid in 
November 1992. This turn o f events rendered moot whether the Council of Competi­
tiveness engaged in unconstitutional acts or if the existence o f Council itself was 
extra-constitutional. Bush did take advantage o f the "quasi-custom" of creating 
presidential councils to achieve the political goals of the executive branch that could 
not be obtained through other political and constitutional means. This recent develop­
ment has expanded presidential authority and has yet to be successfully challenged by 
the other branches or other political actors.
Thus Bush utilized presidential authority for political ends when it came to 
environmental policy. Environmental policy ends were only sought when it was 
deemed politically expedient - in other words when they coincided with political 
objectives.
DECISION MAKING 
Bush’s decision making in terms o f environmental policy ranged from devious 
to mercurial. Both roles revealed a stark contrast in how Bush decided his administr­
ation’s approach toward the environment would be. Within the chief executive role 
Bush strived to be subtle and surreptitious in his approval o f Clean Air Act circum­
vention. On the other hand, within the chief diplomatic role, he made decisions in a
defensive and reactive manner. He sought to appease his conservative critics and 
supporters o f the Rio environmental agenda but ended up appeasing neither.
Bush, in effect, employed a good cop-bad cop stratagem to undermine the 
Clean Air Act provisions he had supported earlier. He hoped to stage Quayle as the 
bad cop and him self the good cop. In order to execute this plan he assigned Quayle 
the same role he assumed when he was Vice President - chairman of a presidential- 
created council designed to achieve executive political goals which were not obtain­
able through established constitutional, bureaucratic and political means. Quayle 
would directly oversee the usurpation of the A ct’s intent under the guise o f champion­
ing the business and economic interests o f the nation. W hile Quayle performed this 
task, Bush could stand on the sideline and project some reasonable semblance for 
concern about the environment. His actions and the evidence at hand indicate he 
wanted to claim credit for the 1990 Clean A ir Act provisions in order to prove his 
environmental credentials to his skeptics, but also dismantle key Act provisions in 
order to sustain the support o f conservatives and major contributors. The actual 
political outcome was mixed.
Bush’s gambit to secure conservative support did achieve some success. He 
was able to capture the conservative vote in the 1992 election and renew even better 
contribution levels compared to his 1988 campaign. Nevertheless he lost the election. 
A whole host o f factors contributed to his election defeat and one policy area Bush 
received a significant negative rating was the environment. His policy maneuvers did 
not ring true in the eyes o f the public and Congress. As President, he had to assume
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responsibility for the Councils’s actions. His attempt at schizophrenic policymaking 
did not succeed.
W hile Bush was at least determined to retract his Clean A ir commitments, he 
proved indecisive and vacuous in his decision making within the chief diplomatic role 
toward the Rio conference. The performance was a notable departure from  the chief 
executive who crafted a subtle effort to walk the Clean Air tightrope and a polar 
opposite from the chief diplomat who displayed exceptional decision making capabili­
ties in assembling international, congressional, and public support behind the Persian 
Gulf W ar effort. During the Persian G ulf conflict Bush initiated the effort, executed 
it, and fulfilled his policy objectives. In contradistinction, Bush was led by the 
public, Congress, and other international leaders into participating at the summit. His 
resistance to attending stemmed from conflicting staff advice and his campaign team ’s 
misunderstanding of public sentiment toward the conference. Needless to say, Bush 
conditioned his participation on securing varying treaty concessions in order to 
achieve what he deemed were vital political assets for winning re-election. So, 
through crude political means. Bush actually employed his decision making capacity 
to achieve dubious policy ends - a pyrrhic victory. Thus Bush’s decision making 
reflected almost exclusive concern for political self-preservation and not environmen­
tal policy ends.
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EXPERTISE
This determinant is intrinsically closely connected to the decision making 
determinant, and in the case o f Bush’s environmental policy making a virtual mirror.
In both roles, the expertise determinant proved a vital factor in the outcomes of his 
environmental policy decisions.
W ithin the chief executive role, Bush relied heavily on Q uayle’s Council to 
handle the detail work o f using dubious legal means to spark the economy and rescue 
his fading re-election hopes. The Council’s strategy included gutting the Clean Air 
Act to both renew key business support and calculating environmental relief burden 
would help drive economic recovery. Bush was deft at elevating Q uayle’s policy 
recommendations over Reilly’s.
In juxtaposition, Bush’s inability to command leadership at the Rio conference 
reflected the deep divisions within his staff. He was genuinely at a loss whether to 
heed Scowcroft’s advice vis-a-vis Quayle’s. In this situation expertise broke down on 
him.
PUBLIC INPUTS
Public inputs influenced the two roles differently. Bush and his team did not 
know how to respond to public opinion to their advantage. They knew the reversal 
on the Clean Air Act promulgation would antagonize the general public and attempted 
to shield Bush from the about face and also redefine the actions as necessary for 
aiding economic recovery. This strategy was an attempt to redirect public opinion.
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This approach was also adopted for the Rio conference. Public opinion 
favored United States participation in the conference and support for the conference’s 
agenda. Again Bush and his advisors believed his re-election hinged on emphasizing 
economic recovery over a meaningful environmental program . Thus he attended the 
conference after gaining concessions that rendered m ajor portions of the varying pacts 
weak. His attendance, in part, was a sop to public opinion but his performance did 
not convince the electorate his efforts were sincere. The Bush team miscalculated 
assuming a recalcitrant stance would shift public opinion to Bush’s advantage in the 
re-election effort. Thus Bush was never able to get a handle on how to respond to 
public inputs or redirect public opinion to his advantage.
CRISIS
Bush’s performance within both roles and cases reveal he did not view 
environmental policy as addressing a crisis situation. Nor did he define the immedi­
ate and future condition o f the environment as a crisis and rally support behind an 
executive initiative to meet such a challenge. That kind o f effort may have shored up 
public opinion to his favor. Relying on staff advice, he instead attempted to defuse 
concern about the current status o f the environment and its future. This approach 
backfired and hurt his credibility on environmental issues.
This investigation indicates Bush was ineffective in both defining the goals of 
his administration’s environmental policy and utilizing the tools necessary for
fulfilling such policy goals. He did not reconcile him self to the public positions he 
forwarded with his political ambitions. As a result, substantive environmental 
progress was stalled but, ironically, his political ambitions were frustrated.
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